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ADVERTISING ***TRANSPARENCY INDEX*** FOR SOCIAL MEDIA PLATFORMS

REPORT FROM THE OBSERVATORY OF THE
DISINFORMATION INDUSTRY AND ITS IMPACT ON
CONSUMER RELATIONS IN BRAZIL

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Presentation

Observatory of the disinformation industry and its impact on consumer relations in Brazil

This report is one of the results of research developed within the scope of the *Observatory of the disinformation industry and its impact on consumer relations in Brazil*, a project in partnership between NetLab UFRJ and the National Consumer Secretariat of the Ministry of Justice and Public Security (Senacon/MJSP).

The main objective of the observatory is to provide inputs that support public policies for consumer protection, based on analyses of the infrastructure, political economy and strategies for manipulating consumer relations and public opinion of disinformation and influence operations that have been developing on social media platforms.

Given the **scarcity of qualified information** for applied social research based on digital advertising data, we present here the **Advertising Transparency Index for Social Media Platforms (ATI)** in Brazil. The ATI follows a structured, systematized and reproducible roadmap, based on parameters and dimensions of data quality, to evaluate mechanisms for accessing data on advertisements promoted on the main social media platforms operating in Brazil.

It assesses the **level of transparency and quality of advertising data on the main social networks operating in Brazil**: Meta, Telegram, LinkedIn,

Google, X/Twitter, TikTok, Kwai and Pinterest. The assessment is based on access to paid content data, driven by advertisers' investment in the platforms. Based on the scores obtained, the platforms are classified into five levels: **Irrelevant or no transparency** (0 to 20), **Poor transparency** (21 to 40), **Regular transparency** (41 to 60), **Satisfactory transparency** (61 to 80) and **Ideal transparency** (81 to 100).

The **ATI** is part of a broader study on the transparency of social media platforms in accessing data of public interest. In addition, we have developed other transparency indicators, compiled in the **DTI – Social Media Platform Data Transparency Index** –, which assesses various parameters and dimensions of quality in the provision of data on **public content generated by users, published without paid promotion to the platforms, for academic research purposes**.

It is important to highlight that researchers in several countries in the Global North have access to quality data for public interest research purposes on social media platforms, and the lack of access by Brazilian researchers can hinder the country's scientific, technological and innovation development, in addition to hindering Brazil's competitiveness and sovereignty in digital markets.

Executive Summary

Main Results

No social media platform evaluated achieved an ideal or satisfactory level in the 1st edition of the Advertising Transparency Index (ATI).

Meta obtained the best score, with 49.8 points, which is considered a regular level of transparency. Telegram, LinkedIn and Google come next, with 22.8, 18.3 and 8.2 points, respectively, with transparency levels classified as poor.

Total opacity: Four platforms do not score on any quality dimension.

X/Twitter, TikTok, Kwai and Pinterest did not score in our assessment because they do not offer any transparency tools or mechanisms for ads served in Brazil. By preventing the systematic and cost-free mapping and retrieval of ads, these platforms prevent the auditability of their operations in the advertising sector in Brazil.

Data blackout: Most of the platforms analyzed do not offer an API or interface for accessing and collecting updated ad data.

Currently, only Meta, Telegram and LinkedIn allow the retrieval of updated data from ads circulating on their platforms, with different restrictions applied. However, of these three, only Meta and LinkedIn provide an API and an interface to their ad repositories, allowing for efficient collection of ad data and for content and information from ads to be consulted without requiring technical knowledge.

Partial transparency: Meta only allows the consultation and systematic data collection from ads considered political.

Meta's API and ad repository interface only provide historical data on ads addressing topics which are considered political, electoral and/or socially relevant. Other ads can be viewed in the repository interface, but only while they are being displayed to users of its platforms. Therefore, the analysis of advertising distributed on the company's platforms depends on the categorization of ads by the platform itself, which has been shown to be flawed, imprecise and inconsistent. In practice, this categorization only serves to justify the provision of an arbitrary portion of ad data.

Transparency for whom? Google does not allow the collection of representative and relevant advertising data.

Google only allows the collection of data from political and electoral ads published up until the end of April 2024 through the API and interface of its ad repository. Ads published by verified advertisers in the last year can only be consulted through the interface, based on the names registered by advertisers on the company's network, which are often impossible for those who consult them to know in advance. In other words, Google only provides insufficient and outdated samples of ad data, which cannot be searched and consulted properly. For this reason, the company's transparency measures were considered unsatisfactory in most of the proposed parameters.

Insufficient navigability: APIs and interfaces of ad repositories do not allow for the satisfactory application of search parameters and filters.

Only Meta and LinkedIn retrieve up-to-date ad data from keyword searches in their APIs and ad repository interfaces, but filters by advertiser and by the state from where users viewed ads are only available on Meta.

The situation on other platforms is even worse: Telegram's API only allows the retrieval of data from ads displayed on a channel that is previously known to the user, without applying any filters. Google's API and repository interface, in addition to returning only outdated and non-representative data, do not allow searches for user-defined keywords.

Relevant agents in the advertising sector, but without transparency obligations and without accountability.

The lack of transparency guarantees a competitive advantage for big tech, creating asymmetries in relation to competitors in the advertising sector, such as other media outlets. Opacity is not a technical imposition, but a choice that makes it difficult to apply the rules of the National Advertising Self-Regulation Council (Conar) and the Consumer Protection Code (CDC), in addition to government regulations.

Opaque micro-segmentation: Data on audience profiling, the main differentiator of boosted posts, is scarce.

Meta is the only platform that allows the recovery of data on the demographic and geographic segmentation of users who viewed ads, but only in cases of political, electoral and/or socially relevant ads. Data related to reach and amount invested are also returned only for these ads, and are delivered in very broad value ranges, which prevents efficient analysis of their distribution.

It is important to highlight that big techs already have the means to deliver this data with satisfactory granularity: in the European Union (EU), for example, social media platforms covered by the Digital Services Act (DSA) are required to inform the exact number of users impacted by all the ads displayed on them and the targeting criteria defined by advertisers for their distribution.

None of the platforms publish transparency reports about their advertising services in Brazil.

The social media platforms evaluated do not provide any reports detailing manual or computational moderation actions to prevent illegal, irregular or abusive advertising in Brazil. However, documents of this type are published by some of the platforms analyzed in European Union countries.

Brazilian users have less access to ad data than Europeans.

The greatest asymmetries between the European and Brazilian markets were identified in the cases of X/ Twitter, TikTok and Pinterest. Due to obligations imposed by the DSA, these platforms provide ad repositories via APIs and/or interfaces for consulting data on ads published in European Union member countries, but not in Brazil. Google adopts a similar practice by providing a more complete and up-to-date ad repository in the EU. Therefore, the decision not to expand these measures to other locations is not technical, but political.

Priority Recommendations

Make collecting public data on advertising possible

- We recommend providing an official, **public API** for full, programmatic, and free access to ad data. APIs ensure **greater customization and automation** of data collection processes, allowing data acquisition to gain scale.
- Furthermore, we recommend offering a **user interface** for accessing and collecting data, which offers **easy navigation and does not require technical programming knowledge** so that any interested citizen can consult it, as a way of democratizing information.
- It is essential that **data is provided on all advertisements published on social media platforms**. Differentiating between political, electoral and socially relevant advertisements as a criterion for providing or not providing data is **inefficient, imprecise** and **undermines the transparency** of advertising, in addition to giving platforms the power to classify and arbitrate on what is or is not political in the Brazilian online environment.

Increase quality and standardization of the data provided

- Audience **micro-targeting** for content distribution is a central feature of ads served on social media platforms. Therefore, profiling **data must be accessible, complete and accurate**.
- It is also important to have transparency on ads **that are moderated**, as well as information about **advertisers who are suspended**, giving public access to data and the reasons for moderating commercial content, even if their content is restricted.
- Social media platforms should provide data on **user engagement with ads**, as they provide information on the attitudes and reactions of people who viewed them, giving a real idea of the number of users impacted by ads.

Ad Repository Features

- Ad APIs and repositories must consistently and **correctly apply any search**, selection, and filtering criteria for data retrieval determined by interested parties.
- Offering **customized keyword searches is an essential feature for collecting relevant data** about ads through APIs and ad repository interfaces, as is being able to select individual advertisers.
- It is essential that repository APIs and interfaces allow the application of **geographic location filters**, either by **profiling criteria** determined by advertisers, or by the audience that actually viewed an ad.
- Applying time and **date filters** to retrieve ad data is essential for performing relevant **longitudinal analyses**.

Clarity of Ad Repository API Documentation

- It is important that API documentation is made publicly available, **without the need for individual requests**, in Portuguese, and with a clear description of its terms of use.
- The official API documentation should **list possible errors** for each available endpoint and provide **clear and understandable examples** of how to make data requests.

Strengthen verification policies for ad serving

- The lack of verification of advertisers should not be used as a justification for opaque advertising data. Social media platforms must subject all their advertisers equally to verification processes as a way of protecting consumers from harmful, irregular and illegal ads.

Disclosure of transparency reports on the moderation of advertisements circulating in Brazil

- Periodically published transparency reports are essential, and should contain detailed data on ad and advertiser moderation in Brazil, including the volume of ads removed and advertisers suspended, as well as an indication of the type of irregularity identified in each ad.
- The reports must detail actions to moderate and remove content promoted on social media platforms, stating whether these actions were proactive or carried out as a result of anonymous complaints or requests from courts or state entities in Brazil.

Social Media Platforms and the Advertising-Based Business Model

Social media platforms have become key players in the online advertising market. Their ability to promote content in a micro-targeted manner, i.e. based on personal data, represents a significant transformation that places them at the center of the sector. Even though the corporations responsible for these platforms present themselves only as technology companies, their operations in the communications market make transparency practices necessary as a way to combat risks and insecurities in the advertising sector, to protect both consumers and legitimate advertisers.

The Development of Advertising on Social Media Platforms

Since the advent of the commercial Internet in the 1990s, technology companies have sought ways to make the digital ecosystem profitable amid the growing consensus that “content is free on the Internet ” (Macnamara, 2010). Since then, companies such as Google and Meta (formerly Facebook) have helped catapult new forms of advertising that were nonexistent in offline media, such as sponsored links, boosted posts (also called sponsored posts) and programmatic media, among other new formats.

Google, part of the Alphabet holding company, pioneered an economically sustainable online advertising model when it launched sponsored links in 2000. With the introduction of this service, the platform could offer advertisers a position at the top of its search engine results page, mimicking the aesthetics used in organic results (Van Looy, 2016). Sponsored links also marked a departure from the idea

Google promoted that its practices were guided only by the efficiency and technical neutrality of its recommendation systems, which were now subordinated to its commercial interests (Gonzalez, 2012). Also in 2007, Google took another important step towards deepening this model, when it introduced the possibility of monetizing YouTube videos, directing part of the revenue to content creators (Burns, 2021).

In the case of Facebook, the company began its commercial advertising operations in 2004 by charging for audience targeting in the distribution of online banners, the traditional printed ads on websites or pop-ups widely used at the time. In the following years, Facebook’s advertising model incorporated new services (Fuchs, 2021) until the launch, in 2014, of Lookalike Audiences, which inaugurated boosted posts on the platform (Meta, [N.d.]). Since 2014, revenues from boosted posts have become so central to their model that Meta has

been announcing successive reductions in the reach of organic posts to give more visibility to boosted posts (Peterson, 2016; Samsing, 2018; Wang, 2017).

A striking feature of boosted ads on online platforms is that they blur the boundaries between commercial and non-commercial digital content (Campbell; Grimm, 2019; Reijmersdal; Rozendaal, 2020). By incorporating boosted posts with an aesthetic similar to that of messages that circulate organically in the same digital spaces, sponsored posts can be easily viewed by users without them knowing that they are paid advertising (FTC, 2015a).

Google and Facebook’s experiments with boosting and sponsoring content paved the way for other social media platforms to enter

the online advertising market, improving and adapting their practices. This new form of advertising enabled an unprecedented gain in scale in the advertising market and put an end to disputes over the physical space for displaying ads, now that the same content could be replicated indefinitely for new audiences. It also made it possible to open the market to new actors, whether well-intentioned or not. All of these factors were fundamental to the emergence of the online “influence industry”, which has acted in a coordinated manner to affect users’ perceptions, opinions, and behaviors. It has also served the objectives of state or commercial entities, enabling surveillance-based strategies and the use of data and microtargeting (Briant; Bakir, 2024; Klein, 2024; Tufekci, 2017).

Essential Vocabulary Online Advertising

Advertisement: Traditionally, an advertisement disseminates a message that brands, companies and institutions want to convey to potential consumers, in order to help sell their products and services or to increase the reach of social, political and electoral ideas and campaigns, to name some examples.

Banner: using graphic pieces (such as illustrations, photos or videos) and text, it is the online ad format that most closely resembles the aesthetics of advertisements in magazines and printed newspapers (CADE, 2023; Van Looy, 2016).

Anúncio nativo: This can include texts, images and videos with the advertiser’s message, in a format that mimics the aesthetics of organic content on social media platforms. When they appear on news sites, the editorial style of the publication is evoked. The striking feature of this type of ad is that it “erases the lines that sepa-

rate editorial and advertising content” (Santos Junior, 2023). Scientific research understands that boosted posts are a type of native ad, because they blend in with the organic content displayed in the feeds of social media platforms and because they have discreet signaling, often imperceptible to users (Grigsby, 2020). However, unlike in academia, the communications market in Brazil, which is heavily influenced by the vocabulary used by big tech, tends to only call native ads those which are displayed on websites.

Sponsored link: with the aim of attracting clicks, this type of ad is displayed in search engines with a link to another website accompanied by a short text and, in some cases, images chosen by the advertiser. This type of ad is displayed at the top of the page or in a list on the side of the search engines (Duka; Sikora; Strzelecki, 2023).

The Importance of Advertising for Social Media Platforms

The digital advertising market has been dominated in recent years by large digital platforms, including social media platforms, leading some authors to point to the issue of market concentration worldwide (ACCC, 2020; Statista, 2024a) or even to a possible **duopoly controlled by Meta and Alphabet** (Fuchs, 2018; van Dijck; Nieborg; Poell, 2019).

To maintain a permanently effective model, platforms need to constantly feed their algorithms with a large volume of new data about users, seen as captive audiences (Hermann, 2023), and this **imposes economic barriers to the entry of new competitors** (CADE, 2023). The growing market power of platforms in the advertising sector has the potential to harm competition and hinder the accountability of these companies, in addition to hindering the transparency of their operations and influence on consumers' lives (Carah et al., 2024).

With advertisers increasingly valuing the opportunities offered by audience micro-segmentation, global online advertising revenues are estimated to reach **US\$740.3 billion in 2024** (Statista, 2023). In Brazil, following a sequence of growth in recent years, the digital advertising market generated around **R\$35 billion in 2023**, with 52% of investments concentrated on social media platforms (Kantar Ibope Media, 2024). Of the amounts spent, **33% were through direct investments, without the intermediation of agencies**. In other words, more than a third of the investment made in online advertising is opaque and unauditible, being made directly by individuals or companies with the platforms.

In fact, technology companies have increasingly oriented their services towards the dissemination of paid content to hyper-

segmented audiences (Hermann, 2023). Advertising is now the core of the business model of companies like **Meta** and continues to expand (Statista, 2024b). In 2023 alone, digital advertising operations accounted for almost **98% of the company's annual revenue** (Meta, 2024). The same is true for **Alphabet**, the holding company of companies owned by or linked to **Google**, which earned around **US\$237 billion** from online advertising alone in 2023 (more than 77% of annual revenue), confirming a trend of growth (Alphabet, 2024; Statista, 2024a). Although Google and Meta stand out for earning hundreds of billions of dollars from digital advertising, this business model in which a significant part of the revenue comes from ads is also replicated on other platforms such as **TikTok, Twitter, LinkedIn, Pinterest and Kwai** (Iqbal, 2024a; Iqbal, 2024b; Iqbal, 2024c; Statista, 2024c; Statista, 2024d).

In order for the advertising service promoted by digital platforms, including social media platforms, to gradually become more valuable, platforms must collect increasingly massive and accurate data about their users in order to effectively track and predict individual behaviors and preferences (Arogyaswamy, 2020). On the advertisers' side, the platforms have facilitated the delivery of targeted and low-cost ads, making online advertising "a service without substitute" (CADE, 2023, p. 102) due to its unique characteristics in offline advertising. Therefore, the use of sophisticated algorithms for **user profiling and micro-segmented distribution of ads based on personal data** makes social media platforms a new player in the sector, with an unprecedented capacity for distributing content in a personalized manner and with great market power.

Sponsored post or boosted post: mimics the format of organic posts and is published by a page or profile on social media platforms; it is available on the advertiser's profile and is algorithmically boosted, in a micro-segmented manner, based on criteria chosen by the advertiser. They are labeled by the platforms as "paid content", "sponsored" or "promoted", which often goes unnoticed by less attentive users.

Dark post: this is also a type of sponsored post on social media platforms, but in this case, the ad is not displayed on the advertiser's page or profile, and is only visible to users reached through the micro-segmentation criteria defined by the advertiser (Mirago, 2024). The differentiation between dark posts and sponsored posts is explored more by the advertising market than by academia, which tends to classify both as simply "ads".

"Publi" or "Publiposts": generally published by digital influencers or celebrities, this type of advertisement usually involves the creative participation of the person publishing (Schneider, 2022) and appears alongside other organic posts from users; it must be marked with a hashtag such as #publi or #parceriapaga, according to rules established by Conar (Ferreira, 2022).

Programmatic media inventory: a set formed of several digital spaces available for the automated display of advertisements, such as pages on specific websites, out-of-home media (also called "outdoor media"), streaming, feeds from social media platforms, among others (Borges, 2023). The inventory spans multiple ad formats, such as banners, video ads and native ads (Borges, 2023).

Programmatic media: The automatic distribution and allocation of advertising content through algorithms belonging to intermediary platforms (Van Looy, 2016). This ad distribution model is used by social media platforms, inventory aggregator companies, and in different digital media. Out-of-home media, for example, has been transformed by the logic of programmatic media, based on the automated sale of ads in real time on digital screens that occupy physical spaces (Fulgêncio, 2023). Ads are distributed mainly through auctions, at the moment the digital space that forms the inventory of the advertising network in question is accessed or updated (Marotta; Abhishek; Acquisti, 2019). However, the quality of the inventory is what differentiates different advertising providers in digital spaces. In the case of streaming and out-of-home media, for example, the advertiser usually knows the inventory of the digital spaces. In the case of programmatic media on the internet, which distributes advertisements on social networks, applications and websites, the criteria for distributing advertisements are not clear to either the public or advertisers, which makes them susceptible to the formation of low-quality inventories by intermediaries (Santos Junior, 2023).

Similar Business Model to Media Companies

Predictions about user behavior produced from data modeling have become one of the pillars that support the business of digital platforms, including social media platforms (Zuboff, 2021). These platforms **profit by selling advertisers their services for personalizing and targeting advertising messages to hyper-segmented audiences** (Dobber et al., 2023). In short, the business model of these “**new attention merchants**” (Wu, 2016) exploits human attention and resells it to advertisers.

The business model of social media platforms uses strategies to capture and direct audience attention, relying on data management and commercialization systems (Kim, 2024). This business model is only profitable because of the consolidation of the market for **data as a commodity** (Aaltonen; Alaimo; Kallinikos, 2021): it is a series of processes for managing, analyzing and interpreting massive data about the audience, articulating media and technology industries and organizations. Thus, the profitability of services that combine social activities and technological tools depends on the **commercialization of data and the attention of their users** to resell to advertisers (Wu, 2016), as such consolidating “surveillance advertising” (Crain, 2021).

By holding so much data about consumers in an exclusive and private manner, platforms have been increasing their relevance as intermediaries in the circulation of online advertising – a role previously performed by media outlets and media companies. Although they curate and distribute organic content and advertising, the corporations behind the platforms insist that they are not media companies, but merely technology service providers (Napoli; Caplan, 2017).

In this context, treating social media

platforms merely as technology companies **underestimates the cultural, political, and economic dimensions of their operations** and disregards their central role in the current media ecosystem. Researchers have criticized this framing for failing to make explicit how much influence they exert on the distribution of content paid for by third parties and that this is embedded in the black box of microtargeting algorithms (Napoli; Caplan, 2017).

Faced with political, economic and regulatory pressures, social media platforms invest in communication and political lobbying efforts to influence public opinion so that they are perceived as mere intermediaries, with no responsibility for the content promoted in a micro-targeted manner (Ali et al., 2019; Gillespie, 2010; Popiel, 2018). These strategies seek to prevent them from being subjected to regulations and thus losing their competitive advantage (Napoli; Caplan, 2017).

In practice, social media platforms are economic **agents in the advertising sector, but are not subject to the same regulatory standards** as other market players that act as intermediaries between advertisers and media spaces and as providers of these media spaces, such as broadcasters, traditional press outlets and displays in public spaces. In traditional media, the advertising market depends on external audience measurement systems, which have data limitations and are expensive to collect (Napoli; Napoli, 2019). In contrast, social media platforms use personal data from their user networks and sell this knowledge to their advertisers, allowing for the identification of detailed audience profiling on a large scale and at low cost.

There is, however, a critical difference between offline advertising and that displayed on social

media platforms. Unlike advertising displayed on traditional media, which is subject to public scrutiny because it is displayed equally to the entire audience, advertising on social media platforms is distributed by algorithms that operate in an opaque manner, that is, there is no transparency about the content of the ads or their distribution criteria (Carah et al., 2024; Jamison et al., 2020). This means that different

content is displayed to different users and it is not possible to know what is displayed at a given time to different audience segments, which makes it difficult to audit what circulates on the networks (Jamison et al., 2020). With microsegmentation, advertising on social media has managed to dominate the online market by relying on the opacity of the architecture and the compliant governance policies of these platforms.

A Theater of Transparency in a Harmful Advertising Market

Currently, social media platforms have made little effort to make their advertising-based business model more transparent (Reijmersdal; Rozendaal, 2020). Despite an approach that seems friendly and conciliatory, they have made it difficult to access data that allow the development of research and the auditability of its services (Ben-David, 2020; Leerssen et al., 2019).

Platforms’ transparency initiatives have proven ineffective in protecting legitimate consumers and advertisers (Armitage et al., 2023; Hoffman, 2022). Their one-off transparency efforts have been characterized as a “theater” (Bouko; van Ostaeyen; Voué, 2021) because they direct public observation to certain information, such as the content of some ads, instead of enabling complete and systematic analyses of the technical and institutional aspects of automated advertising systems (Carah et al., 2024).

Recent research has focused on auditing advertising on platforms in order to understand how possible micro-segmentation strategies work, to what extent these ads violate local laws and serve to disseminate harmful content, and what the role of companies is, as they have been exempted from liability for the content they publish. (Conger, 2023;

De Vreese; Tromble, 2023). In Brazil, NetLab UFRJ has demonstrated how the market for abusive, irregular, or misleading advertising has expanded on social media platforms, reaching diverse audiences, with different types of misleading, abusive, and fraudulent ads that put users’ safety at risk. For example, ads promoting financial fraud (NetLab UFRJ, 2023b; 2023c; 2023f; 2024a), environmental misinformation (NetLab UFRJ, 2024b), fake medicines, and misogyny (NetLab UFRJ, 2024c), and the use of deepfakes of politicians (NetLab UFRJ, 2024a) circulate widely on platforms such as Facebook, Instagram, and YouTube, which **continue to profit** from various types of harmful advertising.

A market like this, which moves billions of dollars annually, requires **reliability and auditability** in the metrics that assess the impact of campaigns (Sadeghpour; Vljajic, 2021). However, the sector lacks the transparency mechanisms needed for observation, scrutiny and external auditing. Broader access to data on advertisements circulating on social media platforms is essential for the development of public interest **research methodologies, which are essential for protecting consumer rights**.

Advertising on Social Media Platforms: Microtargeting & Opacity

The efficiency of advertising on social media platforms is based on the ability to **translate aspects of users' lives into data** to train algorithmic models and then, with the help of artificial intelligence, **distribute ads in a personalized way** (Aaltonen; Alaimob; Kallinikos, 2021; Beauvisage *et al.*, 2023; Carah *et al.*, 2024; Ghosh, 2020). Using users' personal data, including their interests, browsing and search history, activities such as likes, viewing time, location, network of followers and online connections, otherwise known as **microsegmentation, or microtargeting**, makes it possible to target ads according to the detailed profile of each user. Advertisers define the selection criteria according to their persuasion objectives, in order to find the “**right users**” (Papakyriakopoulos *et al.*, 2018; Ribeiro *et al.*, 2019; Turow, 2011). Therefore, it is a business model that is based on the promise of connecting advertisers with audiences most likely to click, engage and purchase (Carah *et al.*, 2024).

Online advertising functions as a constantly evolving laboratory that allows analyses aimed at anticipating audience consumption patterns (Napoli, 2010; O'Neil, 2021). Social media platforms have the advantage of continually aggregating new data and creating behavioral profiles based on media consumption habits, such as collecting information about users' interactions with the ads themselves. For example, how long they spend watching the ad, whether they clicked on the ad or not, post-click behavior, whether they purchased the product, and the degree of engagement and

appreciation in relation to the content (Crain, 2021; Napoli, 2010).

In order for these ads to be circulated massively to specific audiences, advertising on social media platforms has automated the distribution of ads in digital environments, but also part of the process of buying and selling advertising space (Silveira; Morisso, 2018). This automation depends largely on data about advertisers and users, which is used to establish the price to be paid for the broadcasting of a piece. Since the values are not fixed, ads are targeted to specific users through an auction system (Van Looy, 2016).

Defining auction parameters requires knowledge of advertisers' preferences and consumer behavior (Nekipelov; Wang, 2017). Google, for example, claims to evaluate and price ads based on the ratio between user clicks on the content and the number of impressions of that content – a metric known as “click-through rate per impression” (Varian, 2010). The bid price for an ad is determined by Google's assessment of the relevance of its content. To establish this relevance parameter, the company claims to take into account competition with other advertisers and the behavioral analysis of users on the platform (Zuboff, 2021). Meta, along the same lines as Google and other platforms that use the auction model, claims to also take into account the amount invested by the advertiser, the probability of converting impressions into clicks, and the quality of the ad (Meta, [N.d.]). Although the platforms claim that these are the criteria adopted, it is not possible to conduct an

external verification of the parameters actually applied in the auctions, since this process is opaque. and inaudible, which limits the understanding of how the metrics and criteria presented really work.

Ad pricing and distribution criteria are influenced by the distribution algorithm **without the full knowledge of the advertiser and the audience** (Ali *et al.*, 2021). This opaque model allows for market distortions and biases, such as favoring certain advertisers over others. In India, for example, journalists found that Meta charged lower prices for ads run by the country's ruling party (*Bharatiya Janata Party*; BJP) compared to ads run by the opposition, and attributed the difference to the platform's algorithms (Sambhav; Ranganathan, 2022).

Although microtargeting is sold by platforms as a more efficient and effective method than other types of advertising for persuading audiences, Armitage *et al.* (2023) point out that **there is no conclusive evidence** produced by independent organizations that proves this technique actually offers a significant advantage over other existing advertising models.

Furthermore, the opacity of this model makes it difficult to compare with alternative approaches that are less dependent on personal data and more driven by market data. As the effectiveness of microtargeting has become a consensus in the market, advertisers feel dependent on advertising services on platforms to achieve online results. As a result, those who sell online advertising space without the promises of microtargeting tend to face greater difficulty in obtaining higher revenues, since advertisers' perception of the effectiveness of ads directly impacts the amounts paid (Armitage *et al.*, 2023). Therefore, the belief in the effectiveness of microtargeting is **based less on evidence and more on the widespread adoption of this model in the market**.

However, the problems and risks of the microtargeting-based digital advertising model go beyond the issues of inconsistency of information about its true effectiveness. While platforms hold a wealth of information about the users they use in their commercial operations, users, in turn, know little or nothing about what data is collected, how it is used, and how the platforms' segmentation and targeting policies apply to them (Dobber *et al.*, 2023). This results in an **asymmetric relationship of loss of privacy**: constant monitoring of users enables the production of information commodities, such as behavioral profiles, which become the property of companies, while the monitored individuals have little or no control over the use of their own data (Crain, 2021).

While advertising has always been targeted to some degree, microtargeted digital advertising has been particularly criticized for its **intrusiveness and ubiquity**. It has increasingly been associated with a **perception of constant digital surveillance, persistent**, “creepy” or “creepy” ads, over which individuals feel they have no control (Armitage *et al.*, 2023; Ur *et al.*, 2012). Managing personal data control tools has become increasingly complex for individuals, who need to configure preferences separately on each platform, often facing unintuitive interfaces (Armitage *et al.*, 2023).

Although consumers have historically accepted the presence of advertising in order to access media content, the loss of control over their personal data and privacy was not part of this “agreement” (Helberger *et al.*, 2020). In fact, individuals' control over their data is part of the **fundamental right to data protection**, which aims to protect citizens, their autonomy, freedom, and dignity, including in digital environments (ANPD, 2022; Armitage *et al.*, 2023). Since there are no practices that guarantee transparency and security, researchers point out the potential for personal

data leaks, which can be commercialized and used against the individuals themselves. Thus, the way digital advertising currently works poses risks to consumer **security and prevents users from fully exercising their rights**, such as accessing, deleting or contesting the use of their own data (Armitage et al., 2023) – that is, it is a model in which profit takes precedence over the right to privacy (Crain, 2021).

For example, researchers have raised the issue of violations of user privacy and lack of clarity and transparency in microtargeting criteria (Andreou et al., 2019; Khan; Bedoya; Slaughter, 2023). One case of violation of rights was exposed by the Federal Trade Commission in the United States, which fined YouTube and Google \$170 million for using children’s personal data without parental consent; later, another report showed that the company was showing ads even on content marked as “made for kids” (Adalytics, [N.d.]; FTC, 2019). There are at least two problems here, one for consumers, the other for advertisers: firstly, if ads are shown on content “made for kids”, there is **harm done to users** from the improper collection of data for ad targeting; secondly, if the company denies collecting data from children and serves ads anyway, there is harm to advertisers, who are deceived about the effectiveness of the microtargeting service and its true distribution criteria (Khan; Bedoya; Slaughter, 2023).

Furthermore, user behavior analysis can be used maliciously to exploit their vulnerabilities, **influence opinions and behaviors, and mislead consumers** (Tufekci, 2014). This can impact both society and individual decision-making: users can be influenced to **adopt practices that are harmful to their health, fall victim to financial fraud, and reject public policy recommendations**, among other harmful behaviors (Andreou et al., 2019; Cotter et al., 2021; Kruikemeier et al., 2022; WHO, 2022). For example, a Facebook data leak revealed that the platform could predict the emotional state of adolescents so that advertisers could target content to those who were more vulnerable,

based on the premise that emotionally vulnerable consumers were more likely to be persuaded (Crain, 2021).

Because the microsegmentation operating model can access various types of user information, including sexuality, religion, political stance, and health status, this also leaves room for various discriminatory practices that are considered toxic to society (Armitage et al., 2023; Maréchal, 2018). Meta platforms, for example, have already been criticized for providing targeting options based on criteria such as race, gender, and “ethnic affinity” (Cotter et al., 2021; Armitage et al., 2023). These categories allow for the reproduction of social discrimination, as in the case of Google Ads, where men received more ads for well-paid jobs than women (Datta; Tschantz; Datta, 2015). Previous studies have also shown that Meta platforms tend to show ads to audiences that the platform’s algorithm deems appropriate, which can reinforce gender stereotypes (Ali et al., 2019).

Furthermore, microtargeting can be used in **political processes**, such as political campaigns and election periods, and can be used to manipulate citizens and influence votes. Since they are not visible to everyone, these ads limit public debate and make it difficult to challenge false or misleading information, reducing the population’s confidence in democracy and the electoral process (Medert; Otto; Perczel, 2024).

The use of microtargeting in political contexts also contributes to worsening in political polarization and facilitates the spread of misinformation (Armitage et al., 2023). Although Meta has stated its commitment to combating harmful content, an investigation into the 2024 US elections revealed that ad networks promoting misleading content used Facebook and Instagram to serve more than 160,000 **problematic ads on electoral and social issues**, which were displayed to users approximately 900 million times (Silverman; Bengani, 2024).

Advertising on social media platforms has been identified as a vector for various content that is harmful to society, such as **disinformation campaigns** (Armitage et al., 2023). False or misleading content can appear both in advertisements and in content adjacent to them, since distribution is automated. Considering that the reputation of legitimate brands and advertisers can be compromised by association with illegal, toxic or inappropriate content, the industry has treated this problem as a security issue for brand image (Armitage et al., 2023). Although platforms claim to use control mechanisms and specific policies to prevent content such as disinformation and fraud from appearing next to advertisements, researchers have shown that these measures **have not actually proven to be effective** (Armitage et al., 2023).

Another opacity issue for advertising on social media platforms concerns the **lack of rigorous control over advertisers**: There is no strict verification processes required, nor the need to submit documents, to start promoting ads on Meta, Telegram, Google, X/Twitter or TikTok, for example (Santini et al., 2024a). To become an advertiser on Facebook, all you need is an account on the platform and a payment method, such as a credit card (Andreou et al., 2019). Inconsistent verification is especially problematic when it comes to **irregular advertisers**, who, without any formal control, manage to remain anonymous, even when publishing problematic, false or fraudulent content (Ciriaco, 2024). Evidence indicates that the possibility of impacting specific audiences and the lack of advertiser verification mechanisms **attract fraudsters and malicious advertisers** (NetLab UFRJ, 2024c; 2023e).

Therefore, this is a **doubly advantageous system for illegitimate and malicious advertisers**: on the one hand, they can use targeting criteria to reach vulnerable people in an optimized and inexpensive way; on the other, they can take advantage of the anonymity guaranteed by the platforms to promote criminal and

harmful practices against users without being held accountable. The lack of transparency and stricter advertiser verification policies make it difficult to identify and hold the agents involved accountable when irregularities or illegalities are identified. Thus, the opacity of operations and the indiscriminate use of data can generate negative impacts for legitimate brands and advertisers themselves, in addition to putting democratic integrity, consumer safety, user dignity and their fundamental rights at risk.

The Ad Transparency Repositories

An ad repository is a public tool that systematically provides information on ads served on digital platforms, including social media (Leerssen et al., 2021). It can be used to gather information about advertisers, the number of impressions achieved by ads, amounts spent and target audience segmentation (Leerssen et al., 2019). Ad repositories emerged as a response by platforms to political crises, civil society concerns about the use of microsegmentation for electoral purposes (Bossetta, 2020) and criticisms raised about digital advertising (Leerssen et al., 2019).

According to Bossetta (2020), the decision to create mechanisms to increase or decrease transparency is motivated by **commercial and political factors** on the part of the platforms, which often adopt measures that prevent the full auditability of the promoted content. The disparities in the degrees of transparency between repositories also include the way in which platforms verify the content and identity of their advertisers, as well as the data they choose to make available on audience segmentation (Santini et al., 2024a; 2024b).

The initial practices of documenting and making advertising data available through repositories were proactively implemented by big tech companies themselves to respond to social pressures and try to avoid stricter regulation (Leerssen et al., 2019). This is only possible because, with the size, scale and power that large platforms have, they are able to resist regulatory interference, shielding themselves from external influences and proposing to follow only their own policies and terms of use (Wagner, 2018).

Ad repositories have been widely criticized by researchers who consider their content incomplete or unreliable (Edelson; Lauinger;

McCoy, 2020; Leerssen et al., 2019; Rosenberg, 2019; Santini et al., 2024a; Sosnovik; Goga, 2021). By promoting only specific measures, platforms transfer the responsibility for identifying harmful ads to academics and civil society (Carah, 2024), contribute to strategically limiting data search and analysis (Bossetta, 2020), do not allow analysis of the context in which ads are displayed (Carah, 2024), and circumvent possible regulations (Zalnieriute, 2021). Thus, the ad transparency measures currently applied by platforms are not sufficient to ensure a safe environment for commercial exchange for consumers (Ghosh, 2020; Zalnieriute, 2021).

Meta's Ad Library, for example, was launched in 2018, shortly after the scandals involving the misuse of personal data from Facebook and Instagram users during the 2016 US elections and Brexit (Leerssen et al., 2021). Since its launch, researchers have been pointing out problems in the use of the tool, such as the removal of ads from the repository before the indicated period (Edelson; Lauinger; McCoy, 2020), the presence of errors in the interface (Rosenberg, 2019), limitations related to the identification of political ads (Pochat et al., 2022; Sosnovik; Goga, 2021) and differences in transparency protocols adopted between different countries (Santini et al., 2024a). For example, Meta's ad repository in the United States and the United Kingdom offers more transparency than that available in Brazil for ads dealing with housing, employment and credit, as well as ads on political and social issues (NetLab UFRJ, 2023f).

Also in 2018, following Meta's initiative, the platform formerly called **Twitter launched its Ads Transparency Center**, an interface that included the content of all ads that circulated

on the platform in the last seven days. The platform also made targeting and investment information available for ads published by politicians campaigning in the United States (Falck, 2018). X/Twitter, however, banned the publication of political ads the following year, and in 2021, it discontinued its ad transparency tool for all types of ads (BBC, 2021).

In 2023, the approval of the Digital Services Act (DSA) led X/Twitter to once again launch an ad transparency tool in the European Union, which it called the **X Ads Repository** (X/Twitter, [N.d.] b). In the same year, the platform once again allowed the boosting of political ads in several countries (ABAP, 2023; Paul, 2023; X/Twitter, [N.d.]d), although it does not offer an interface or API to access its ad repository in all regions (X/Twitter, [N.d.]c).

Google launched its first ad transparency initiative, the **Ad Transparency Center**, in May 2018, which included information on US election ads (Walker, 2018). In Brazil, it launched a repository of political ads in 2022, after having entered into a partnership with the Superior Electoral Court (TSE) with the aim of reducing electoral misinformation (Poder 360, 2022). Initially, it only made pieces available in Brazil which were related to national elections, such as campaigns for the Chamber of Deputies, the Federal Senate and the Presidency of the Republic, but pressure from researchers and civil society led to the repository being expanded to also include candidacies at the state and district levels (Abraji, 2022).

In Europe, in July of 2023, **TikTok** announced the launch of its **Commercial Content Library**, which consists of an API and an interface to the platform's ad repository, also as a result of the DSA (TikTok, 2023). This was the company's first ad transparency initiative, allowing access to data on all ads that circulated in member countries of the European Union, the United Kingdom, and Switzerland since October 1, 2022 (TikTok, [N.d.]c). Using this tool, the content of all ads that circulated in a given country during

a specific time interval can be accessed and their delivery information can be viewed, such as an ad's reach and the audience targeting criteria determined by the advertiser. The tool also allows users to browse the ad repository based on criteria such as advertiser names and search terms.

Pinterest also maintains an **ad repository** interface that meets the minimum criteria required by the DSA (Pinterest, [N.d.]a); however, even in the European Union, the platform does not provide a way to access the repository via an API. Other platforms analyzed here, such as **Kwai** and **Telegram**, are not covered by the scope of the DSA.

Expanding platform transparency regarding digital advertising data has been highlighted as a global need by institutions such as UNESCO (2023) and the OECD (2024). However, ad transparency policies and repositories for Brazil are more limited than in other countries.


(Santini et al., 2024a). Here, the lack of binding criteria contributes to the limitations of transparency protocols adopted by the platforms, which prevents systematic analyses from being carried out.

Glossary: Advertising Data Collection

API: Official access to data programmatically

API is the acronym for Application Programming Interface. The basic functionality of the API is to establish communication between two components (AWS, [N.d.]), such as the ad repository database and the terminal of the person who wants to retrieve this data. APIs enable data sharing (PostMan, [N.d.]) between applications, systems, devices and platforms of different natures, facilitating interoperability between different systems.

Through the API, researchers, developers and regulatory bodies can program systems that automatically request and retrieve data from the advertising repositories of social media platforms. The request must comply with the formats, definitions and protocols established in each API. Therefore, it is important that instructions for use with some degree of detail are made available in the appropriate documentation.



Ad Repository User Interface

UA user interface is an online environment that allows interaction between the user and the database through graphical elements such as icons, windows, menus and other visual indicators. In the case of a social media platform ad repository, it refers to an application that allows viewing, querying, exploring and, ideally, downloading the data of promoted pieces.

The interface facilitates access to the advertising ecosystem as it does not require programming knowledge, but, on the other hand, it does not allow for the programmatic collection and exploration of data and does not guarantee systematic and recurring monitoring of advertisements




Ad Transparency Report

Created in the 2010s, transparency reports emerged as a voluntary initiative by platforms to respond to social pressures regarding content moderation on social media platforms.

Traditionally they cover organic posts but with growing concerns about the promotion of illegal and harmful content transparency reports on paid content are now mandatory in some countries (European Union, 2022a). Transparency reports are expected to include the number of requests for content removal and the reasons for moderation.

The main limitation is the lack of information on the moderation actions undertaken on the platforms' own initiative, the criteria used and motivations. Other frequent problems in these reports come from the lack of concrete examples, the unsatisfactory granularity of the aggregated data and the excessive focus on government action. In addition, the lack of standardization makes it impossible to compare between platforms.



The Flaws in Categorizing Political Ads

One of the main limitations of the ad repositories initially made available by the platforms is the separation **between so-called “political” advertising** (which may or may not cover social issues, depending on the platform in question) and commercial advertising, mainly because the interpretation of what is considered “political” on each platform and in each country or region varies significantly (Leerssen et al., 2019). This separation is a strategic decision made by the platforms – without any technical or regulatory basis – to promote a certain **transparency and openness of data for an arbitrary sample of ads**, based on a definition stipulated by them. Under this pretext, they exempt themselves from making available data on all advertising pieces broadcast. That is, by creating the idea that only “political” ads should be transparent, they **obscure more substantive and fundamental questions** about the platform and its governance (Zalnieriute, 2021).

In fact, researchers propose several possibilities to distinguish political ads from commercial ads, demonstrating how the lack of consensus favors ambiguities in their classification (Dommett; Zhu, 2023). The review carried out by Dommett and Zhu (2023) shows that, among the definitions that might distinguish political ads from commercial ads, there are contents which promote or attack candidates during elections and mandates. These are pieces that are designed to promote the political interests of individuals, parties, groups, governments and other organizations. Other definitions presented by the authors rely on an even broader sense, defining political activity as patterns of human relations involving power, authority or government or, even, attempts to redefine possible economic, social and political parameters (Dommett; Zhu, 2023).

A survey conducted by Sosnovik and Goga (2021) demonstrates how the categorization of ads based on vague and poorly defined definitions by platforms, as is the case of ads called “political,” is complex and **prone to errors on the part of advertisers, moderators**, and classifiers trained with machine learning tools. Analyzing ads that circulated in the Meta ecosystem, the study illustrates the inconsistency of the “political ads” category, showing that there is a high degree of divergence among study participants in the interpretation of the content of the pieces analyzed, especially in ads related to humanitarian and social issues.

Given the difficulty in establishing precise boundaries to distinguish political advertising, some platforms, such as Facebook, Instagram and Telegram, include the concept of “**issue ads**” in their understanding of political ads (Leerssen et al., 2019). These so-called “**sensitive**” ads refer to social issues of national importance. Considering the current socio-political relevance of topics such as immigration, sexual politics, terrorism or racial policies, it could be said that there are pertinent reasons for including broader social issues; however, in practice, the concept of “**social and political issues**” is too broad and subjective (Leerssen et al., 2019). Pochat et al. (2022) found that 55% of ads labeled as political and/or socially relevant on Meta platforms are not, in fact; in addition, the same research indicates that 78% of ads that meet the definition of political and/or socially relevant ads circulate without this classification.

Another point to highlight is that it is up to the advertiser to indicate whether the publication should be classified as political and/or socially relevant. Frequent cases of irregular or fraudulent pieces show that

malicious advertisers use these loopholes to avoid declaring their ads as political and/or socially relevant, circumvent platform policies and violate local laws (Gong, 2019; Kim, 2024; Global Action Plan, 2020; FTC, 2022; NetLab UFRJ, 2023f; NetLab UFRJ, 2024c).

As a result, digital platforms, especially social media platforms, have been characterized by inefficiency in labeling ads and several violations of local laws, in addition to their own terms of use. Especially during important periods and events, such as elections, it is common to find ads that violate local regulations and resolutions, including insufficient data on political advertisers and the inappropriate promotion of electoral content by individuals and companies, which is prohibited in Brazil (Mello, 2023; NetLab UFRJ, 2022a; NetLab UFRJ, 2022b). Similar violations occur even on platforms that declare that they do not recognize the political use of their ad publishing tools, as they often do not apply their own guidelines and promote content that contravenes the expected standards (Dantas, 2023; Mello, 2023; NetLab UFRJ, 2023a).

Thus, the declaration of a ban on the publication of political ads by some platforms brings two problems: the first is that the declaration of a ban in itself is not enough to prevent political ads from continuing to circulate on these platforms. Although some companies state

in their terms of use that they do not allow political ads, they have been ineffective in verifying and moderating ads and advertisers, including those with a political-electoral nature, as shown by some studies by NetLab UFRJ (2024d). The second problem is that when these companies have declared a ban on the publication of political ads, it has resulted in a reduction in the transparency of this type of content, making any public scrutiny and/or monitoring initiative impossible (NetLab UFRJ, 2024d). This makes it more difficult for researchers and entities interested in analysing or auditing the online advertising ecosystem, since the platforms only provide data on those ads that they themselves classify or recognize as political.

Thus, due to the flaws in ad classification and given that it is not possible to transfer this responsibility or judgment to the platforms, researchers recommend that platforms implement transparency policies that cover all ads served, whether they are political or not (Leerssen et al., 2019; Sosnovik; Goga, 2021), a measure that is already required by the DSA (European Union, 2022a). The importance of providing information about all ads, political and non-political, is essential for public observation and ensuring the application of the rules provided for.

Electoral Advertisements: Regulatory Responses from the Brazilian Electoral Court

In Brazil, the Superior Electoral Court (TSE) was the first regulatory body to officially recognize boosted posts as a form of advertising in December 2017 (Ferreira; Doederlein, 2018). Although Law 13,488, also approved by Congress in 2017, mentions boosting among permitted electoral expenditures, it was limited

to the “paid prioritization of content resulting from internet search applications” (Brasil, 2017). It therefore refers to sponsored links in search engines and not to boosted posts on social networks. Currently, the TSE remains the only source of legal norms to unequivocally treat, and regulate, boosted posts as a type of online

advertising, even if it is limited to political-electoral propaganda.

In order to avoid disparities between different advertising systems and ensure greater transparency for political-electoral advertisements, Resolution No. 23,732/2024 of the TSE establishes a definition of political advertisements regardless of the classification made by the platform. Thus, the TSE classifies political-electoral content as:

“Anything that deals with elections, political parties, federations and coalitions, elective positions, people holding elective positions, candidates, government proposals, bills, the exercise of the right to vote and other political rights or matters related to the electoral process” (Brazil, 2024, n.p.).

To that end, starting with the 2024 municipal elections, the court determined that platforms that allow the promotion of **political-electoral content** must make a **public repository** available with all these advertisements, and established minimum data quality criteria, related to dimensions of accessibility, relevance, timeliness and accuracy.

More specifically, this repository should allow the search for ads using keywords and enable systematic collection through an interface. Information about the **content of the ad**, as well as its **cost, boosting period, reach, targeting** criteria defined by the advertiser at the time of the ad placement and those **responsible for payment** should also be made available (Brazil, 2024).

With the imposition of the resolution in February 2024, the platforms were supposed to comply with the court's new rules by the end of the following April. However, the decision led to a wave of bans on the broadcasting of political ads under the terms proposed by the TSE.

Google decided to suspend ad boosting on the grounds of “technical inability to comply” with the terms set forth by the TSE (Waltenberg, 2024). **Kwai**, which until then did not have an ad repository, even though it allowed the broadcasting of political content, launched its Political or Electoral Ad Library in late April 2024 (Kwai, [N.d.]). However, days later it decided to ban political ads in the country and discontinue its repository (Trindade, 2024). **X/Twitter**, without formally announcing its decision, removed Brazil from the list of countries where this type of advertising is, at least in part, permitted (Iory, 2024), without providing a repository with minimum information for detecting irregular ads in Brazil.

TikTok, Pinterest and Telegram have declared that they prohibit any type of political advertising on their platforms and also do not provide an ad repository in the country. LinkedIn, despite declaring that it prohibits political advertising on its platform, has an ad repository on general topics. Therefore, Meta is the only company analyzed that openly allows the placement of political ads in the country and offers a repository that meets the demands of the Electoral Court.

Although this electoral court resolution can **inform more robust and lasting future policies**, today, it has limited application and, therefore, does not manage to increase the transparency of digital platforms in a systematic and regular way.

Why Measure Transparency Through Quality of the Data?

Online advertising has posed a myriad of political, social and economic challenges with its business practices based on the use of user data and the constant technological innovation it incorporates. However, research on the political economy of the **online advertising ecosystem** is still in its infancy, especially in Brazilian, and there are few empirical studies on the dynamics of this market covering advertisers, funders, segmentation strategies, market competition, pricing criteria, industry revenue and profit, most effective formats and content, boosting, power of persuasion, social impacts, among many other possible approaches.

However, due to its potential social and economic impact, this is a market that needs to be analyzed carefully and in detail. Furthermore, to ensure the security of the online environment, advertising transparency mechanisms on social media platforms need to be strengthened and ensure that advertisements can be systematically monitored and audited by applying the strict standards of digital advertising transparency in Brazil.

The Social Media Platform Advertising Transparency Index (ATI) proposed here assumes that **standardizing criteria to systematically assess** the transparency and quality of advertising data on social media platforms tends to have a **positive impact on the transparency** of these spaces and on the accountability of advertising providers for their services. Transparency can also help reduce **asymmetries in the advertising market** between different media outlets, including digital platforms, resulting from innovations that have emerged with microtargeting and algorithmic content curation and distribution. A framework for assessing the quality of advertising data on social media platforms is based on the notion

that big tech data governance is a matter of public interest and, therefore, goes beyond the corporate and private spheres of these companies (Finger, 2019).

Given the medium- and long-term benefits of transparency in online advertising, a definition of practices and policies that generate greater user confidence in the paid and/or sponsored content they access on social media platforms is greatly needed, in light of the growing disinformation industry that is taking shape in the online ecosystem and the profusion of scams and frauds that are promoted in these spaces. However, **databases must present certain characteristics** in order to establish satisfactory access and quality criteria for research and regulatory debate based on the values of transparency and public utility (Dommert; Power, 2023). The dialogue with authors who address data quality in technical areas (Barbieri, 2019; Mahanti, 2018) and in other areas of Communication and Applied Social Sciences (Dommert; Power, 2023; Michener; Bersch, 2013) has much to add to the auditability capacity of online advertising, by pointing out different dimensions of quality that can be considered according to the objectives of the analysis.

Various researchers (Campbell; Grimm, 2019; Dobber et al., 2023; Reijmersdal; Rozendaal, 2020) and international bodies that define standards and conduct for advertising (Conar, 2021; FTC, 2013; FTC, 2015a; FTC, 2015b; FTC, 2023; ICC, 2018) emphasize clear and effective communication about how content may be a form of advertising as a way to make online advertising more transparent. Informing about the commercial nature of paid content is a fundamental transparency measure. However, despite being mandatory by consumer laws

in various countries, microtargeted online advertising on social media platforms cannot be audited systematically and independently if there is no access to qualified data to monitor the ads displayed on them.

Greater ad transparency would also help address another important problem: the asymmetry of information between social media platforms and the consumers who use them. By making qualified data available for analyzing online advertising, users can have access to more information about how platforms systematically operate (Crawford, 2021), the use of their personal data to target microtargeted content, and the systemic risks embedded in algorithmic recommendation systems. Access to this data and the production of independent research based on it tends to increase citizens' ability to evaluate advertising on digital platforms and make informed and autonomous decisions (Dobber et al., 2023).

Although quality data is essential in any research situation, the assessment of what constitutes quality data depends on context. The aspects considered in the assessment of data quality are always **intrinsically related to the specific objectives of using those data in that specific context**, even though there are common parameters among different purposes of use. In general terms, data quality parameters and dimensions are used to indicate how suitable a given database is for the intended purpose (Mahanti, 2018).

Once this purpose is clear and the success criteria are defined, it is then possible to identify the dimensions and parameters that can assess whether the data has the expected quality. The technical literature recognizes and uses internationally recognized standards, such as ISO 8000 (ISO, [N.d.]).

Quality data increases the reliability and reproducibility of studies and enables important generalizations about the objects analyzed (Srivastava; Mishra, 2021). In addition, well-defined and correctly applied quality parameters

tend to maintain the usefulness and quality of data in the long term. According to the Electronic Code Management Association (ECCMA)¹, low-quality data increases compliance costs and is the main source of transparency-related problems (ECCMA, [N.d.]). In addition to the general gains in technical aspects, quality data for use in online advertising studies also: i) provides information for social media platforms to create and improve transparency measures; and ii) enables assessment of whether the transparency measures they announced are, in fact, being implemented.

The ATI is based on six quality dimensions recommended by the scientific literature, regardless of the particularities of each platform. It assesses the dimensions which are endogenous to the data; completeness, accessibility, consistency and accuracy (Barbieri, 2019; Batini; Scannapieca, 2006; Loshin, 2011; McGilvray, 2008). Other dimensions, such as compliance and relevance (Barbieri, 2019), depend on exogenous factors and, therefore, may vary according to the legal standards in force in each country or the specific objectives of the research.

¹A ECCMA is a non-profit organization and administrator of the technical advisory group of the International Organization for Standardization (ISO) in the USA


Scope of the ATI

The Social Media Advertising Transparency Index assesses the availability, transparency and quality of data on sponsored and boosted posts on the main social media platforms in Brazil: Google², Meta³, TikTok, Kwai, Telegram, LinkedIn, Pinterest, e X/Twitter.

Global advertising revenue of companies owning social media platforms analyzed in 2023 (Official and unofficial estimates)

² Google's advertising network includes ads served on third-party websites and apps, search engines, YouTube videos, Google Discover, Play Store, Google Maps, Google Shopping and Gmail.

³Meta's advertising network includes Facebook, Instagram, Messenger, and Audience Network..



Sources: Kuaishou (2024); Meta (2024); Murphy; Criddle (2023); Oberlo ([N.d.]); Statista (2024e); Statista (2024f); The Block Beats (2024); Wagner (2023).

The ATI Intends to Answer:

What **transparency** and **data access** measures are there for advertisements displayed on the main social media platforms in Brazil?

How high is the **ad data quality** provided by these platforms?

Goals

Standardize

Define **evaluation parameters** on the level of access and data quality of advertisements on social media platforms.

Compare

Compare the performance of each social media platform using common criteria and standardized methodology.

To assess

Systematically and transparently assess the strengths and weaknesses of ad data access and quality.

Improve

Indicate, publicly and objectively, what needs to be improved in the provision of data about advertisements.



Rationale: Which Platforms Do We Analyze?

We only considered social media platforms when formulating the ATI. We consider **social media platforms** to be spaces in which users produce and consume content, interacting and connecting with other users (Ellison; Boyd, 2013).

The main source of revenue for these platforms is advertising. On these platforms, the aesthetics of the ads resemble that of user-generated content (Lee; Kim; Ham, 2016), meaning that their commercial nature often goes unnoticed.

Due to the focus on social networks, programmatic advertising networks and native advertising, for example, are not included in the scope of the ATI. Although Google and Meta also serve ads in spaces other than social media platforms, these companies are pioneers in this market and have a greater reach compared to other platforms.

We build on the premise of the Digital Services Act (DSA), which establishes accountability and transparency measures for digital platforms that reach more than 10% of the European Union population.



Number of users of each platform analyzed in Brazil

*Since Google and Meta do not only serve ads on social media platforms, we considered users of their most popular platforms in Brazil: YouTube and Instagram, respectively. Since they control other digital services which show ads, the number of Brazilian citizens impacted by their advertising networks is even greater.

Source: Kemp (2024); Opinion Box (2024); Shewale (2024)

Methodological Approach

To measure the transparency of the main social media platforms available in Brazil in relation to advertising data, an evaluation script was developed in an iterative and deliberative process, which established the analysis parameters, conceptual definitions and evaluation criteria.

The parameters were evaluated and justified by nine researchers from [NetLab UFRJ](#), divided into pairs that included one expert in data collection, infrastructure and processing and another with experience in data analysis and research design in Computational Social Sciences. The pairs

were also responsible for reviewing responses made by other peers, as shown in [Table 1](#). The distribution of platforms among the researchers took into account prior knowledge and participation in research involving data from the evaluated platform.

Throughout the index development process, the adequacy of the parameters and the relevance of their justifications were continually deliberated jointly by the evaluators and other researchers involved in the study. The evaluation was carried out and reviewed throughout the first half of 2024.

Plataform	Researchers Responsible for Responses	Researchers Responsible for Review
 LinkedIn	E1 and E2	The review was carried out jointly
 Meta	E3 and E4	E5 and E6
 Google	E5 and E6	E3 and E4
 Telegram	E7 and E8	E1 and E2
 X/Twitter	E1 and E2	E7 and E8
 TikTok	E4 and E9	E7 and E8
 Kwai	E4 and E9	E7 and E8
 Pinterest	The answers were discussed together	The review was carried out jointly

Table 1: Division of parameter responses by pairs of experts (E_n)

The roadmap consists of **60 parameters** that analyze **six dimensions of data quality**: completeness, compliance, accessibility, consistency, relevance and accuracy. The assessments were carried out and justified based on five different sources of information:

1. the accumulated experience of [NetLab UFRJ](#);
2. performing access testing and collecting advertising data using the social media platform's ad repository API and interface;
3. the official API documentation for the social media platform's ad repository;
4. social media platforms' ad moderation transparency reports;
5. and the academic literature on the subject.

The obstacles faced by NetLab UFRJ and the solutions developed throughout the construction of its own customized infrastructure for the constant monitoring of ads served on different social media platforms, through APIs and ad repository interfaces, served as the basis for most of the [ATI](#) evaluations. Over the past few years, NetLab UFRJ researchers have published a series of studies involving different online ad ecosystems ([Medeiros et al.; 2024](#); [NetLab UFRJ, 2022c](#); [NetLab UFRJ, 2023d](#); [NetLab UFRJ, 2024a](#); [NetLab UFRJ, 2024d](#); [Santini et al., 2024a](#)). When necessary, we conducted data collection and usability tests on the ad repository interface to better support our responses and justifications.

We also considered the documentation of the ad repository API for data collection. The documentation of an **API reports**, details and explains its operation, indicating to users how to use it. Platforms that provide APIs usually include documentation so that developers can understand them when preparing requests. In

addition, we considered the availability and detailing of **transparency reports** on irregular and illegal ad moderation actions by the platforms analyzed. Finally, we also based our research on national and international academic production **published in high impact journals**, with methodologies that are developed, tested and peer-reviewed.

The parameters can be answered in three different ways: positive, negative or partial evaluation. The partial evaluation, a score equivalent to 50%, is for cases in which the social media platform only meets the minimum expected in the parameter in ads on political, electoral and/or socially relevant topics. As online platforms traditionally promote more effective transparency measures for such ads ([Carah et al., 2024](#); [Sosnovik; Goga, 2021](#)), the partial evaluation is a way of scoring when there are marked differences between transparency measures for this type of advertising and others. Thus, the partial evaluation is applicable to **39 evaluation parameters**.

Evaluation Criteria:

The Dimensions of Data Quality



Positive evaluation is only applicable for political, electoral and/or socially relevant advertisements in this criterion

Completeness (21 parameters):

This dimension indicates whether the data retrieved has the necessary attributes for understanding and whether systematic monitoring can be carried out when collecting it, mainly considering the criteria required for academic and scientific research (Mahanti, 2018). In this dimension, a result is considered complete when the data can be used and applied in different research situations. It is the most important dimension analyzed, since the parameters concern the detailing of the ad data. Since these are advertising pieces and not organic publications, we understand that more information needs to be published for public scrutiny, especially microsegmentation criteria and data on the target audience.

Parameters that make up the Completeness dimension

- * **Q1:** Does the API provide up-to-date data about ad content? (Special Criterion 1)
- * **Q2:** Does the API return up-to-date demographic data about the audience the ad was shown to? (Special Criterion 2)
- * **Q3:** Does the API provide up-to-date geographic data about the audience to which the ad was displayed? (Special Criterion 2)

- * **Q4:** Does the API retrieve all data about the advertiser-defined audience targeting? (Special Criterion 2)
- * **Q5:** Does the API return updated data for inactive ads?
- * **Q6:** Does the API provide up-to-date data on advertisers who have served ads on the social media platform?
- * **Q7:** Does the API provide up-to-date data on ad funders?
- * **Q8:** Does the API provide up-to-date data on the ad boosting period?
- * **Q9:** Does the API retrieve up-to-date data about user engagement with the ad?
- * **Q10:** Does the API allow the application of time filters to retrieve updated data?
- * **Q11:** Does the API clearly and unambiguously signal whether ads were placed by verified or unverified advertisers?
- * **Q12:** Does the repository interface display up-to-date demographic data about the audience the ad was shown to? (Special Criterion 5)
- * **Q13:** Does the repository interface display up-to-date geographic data about the audience the ad was shown to? (Special Criterion 5)
- * **Q14:** Does the repository interface retrieve all data about advertiser-defined audience targeting? (Special Criterion 5)

- * **Q15:** Does the repository interface provide up-to-date data on inactive ads?
- * **Q16:** Does the repository interface return up-to-date data about advertisers who have published ads on the social media platform?
- * **Q17:** Does the repository interface provide up-to-date data on ad funders?
- * **Q18:** Does the repository interface provide up-to-date data on the ad boosting period?
- * **Q19:** Does the repository interface retrieve up-to-date data about user engagement with the ad?
- * **Q20:** Does the repository interface allow the application of temporal filters to retrieve updated data?
- * **Q21:** Does the repository interface clearly and unambiguously signal whether ads were placed by verified or unverified advertisers?

Compliance (12 parameters):

This dimension assesses whether the official documentation and the data retrieved are up to standard in terms of the formats adopted and the legal standards in force in the country (Mahanti, 2018). This is an exogenous dimension, that is, it has more to do with the “‘surroundings’ of the data than to the data itself” and, therefore, more related “to governance and management than to content” (Barbieri, 2019).

Here, we assess, for example, the availability and detail of transparency reports on ad moderation activity by social media platforms.

In addition, we also analyze formal aspects, such as whether the format of dates and URLs are in accordance with the international ISO standard and whether the API documentation is easily accessible and understandable.

Parameters that make up the Compliance dimension

- * **Q22:** Is the data acquisition process and the structure in which it is made available by the API stable?
- * **Q23:** Does the API clearly and unequivocally signal content produced by Artificial Intelligence?
- * **Q24:** Does the API return data in a standardized format?
- * **Q25:** Does the repository interface clearly and unequivocally signal content produced by Artificial Intelligence?
- * **Q26:** Is the API documentation published and available in open access?
- * **Q27:** Is the provided API documentation written clearly and exemplified?
- * **Q28:** Does the documentation clearly describe what the API terms of use are?
- * **Q29:** Is the API documentation available natively in Portuguese?
- * **P30:** Does the social media platform produce and make detailed transparency reports publicly available, without the need for request and with data on its proactive manual and/or computational moderation activity, so as to prevent illegal, irregular or abusive advertising?
- * **Q31:** Is transparency reporting data about ad moderation activity on the social media platform divided by geographic location?

Q32: Is the transparency reporting data on the social media platform's ad moderation actions grouped by the type(s) of violation that led to the removal?

Q33: Do transparency reports on ad moderation specify and present information on requests made by government entities to the social media platform?

Accessibility (11 parameters):

This dimension refers to how easily data for a specific purpose can be located, accessed, obtained and viewed (Mahanti, 2018). Therefore, the data can not merely be accessible; it must be easy to understand and analyse by researchers with varying degrees of technical knowledge. In this dimension, factors such as whether an API and repository interface were available, and whether the platform allows the full extraction of ad data, were analyzed.

Parameters that make up the Accessibility dimension

- * **Q34:** Does the social media platform provide an API to access and collect updated data for all types of published ads? (Special Criterion 1)

Q35: Is API access free?

Q36: Can tokens for API access be created free of charge?

Q37: Can new tokens be created to access to the API without a limit on the amount?

Q38: Does the API provide a form of authentication that allows for simplified automatic renewal of access tokens, without any blocking of data acquisition?

Q39: Is it possible to extract data directly from the API response?

- * **Q40:** Does the API provide a means to retrieve ads from search terms? (Special Criterion 3)
- * **Q41:** Does the API provide a means to retrieve updated data for a specific ad?
- * **Q42:** Does the social media platform provide an ad repository interface to access up-to-date data on all types of published ads? (Special Criterion 4)
- * **Q43:** Is it possible to extract the data displayed in the repository interface? (Special Criterion 4)
- * **Q44:** Is it possible to retrieve current announcements and updated data for all announcements using search terms from the repository interface? (Special Criterion 6)

Consistency (6 parameters):

This parameter assesses whether the format and presentation of data are consistent and identical across the database and in all instances (Mahanti, 2018), as well as whether the search terms and filters used retrieve coherent and non-contradictory data. This dimension analyzes, for example, whether the data returned is different when accessed at different times, generating inconsistencies in systematic monitoring. Consistency is essential to produce accurate and agile reports, as it avoids the need for constant checking and/or correction of data and allows for greater auditability.

Parameters that make up the Consistency dimension

- * **Q45:** Does the API indicate when an ad has been removed for violating the social media platform's terms?
- Q46:** Does the API return persistent data?
- Q47:** Does the API return consistent responses?
- Q48:** Does the API return responses consistent with the parameters and filters used in the request?
- * **Q49:** Does the repository interface signal when an ad has been removed for violating the social media platform's terms?
- Q50:** Does the API retrieve the same data displayed in the repository interface?

Relevance (6 parameters):

This dimension assesses whether the data is relevant for the purpose for which it is intended (Mahanti, 2018), that is, whether it is in line with the objectives of the research

and the request. This dimension analyses, for example, whether it is possible to retrieve data about advertisements based on the indication of keywords of interest, in order to make the retrieved data more appropriate for the expected purpose.

Parameters that make up the Relevance dimension

- * **Q51:** Is it possible to filter advertising data in the API by page or advertiser profile? (Special Criterion 3)
- Q52:** Does the API allow for filtering ad data based on its category?
- * **Q53:** Does the API allow for filtering ad data by geographic location?
- Q54:** Is it possible to filter advertising data in the repository interface by page or advertiser profile? (Special Criterion 6)
- Q55:** Does the repository interface allow for filtering ad data based on its category?
- * **Q56:** Does the repository interface allow for filtering ad data by geographic location?

Accuracy (4 parameters):

This dimension assesses to what extent the data made available and stored reflects reality and how correctly it describes the object, entity, situation or phenomenon of the real world (Mahanti, 2018). Here, we check whether the data on impressions received by ads and the amounts invested in promoting them are sufficiently accurate, so that we can evaluate pricing and segmentation strategies for promoted content.

Parameters that make up the Accuracy dimension

- * Q57: Does the API divide impression ranges by audience segment into small intervals so that trends and audience segmentation strategies can be identified with some precision?

* Q58: Does the API divide investment bands into small increments that make it possible to identify trends and ad pricing strategies with some precision?
- * Q59: Does the repository interface divide impression ranges by audience segment into small increments so that trends and content segmentation strategies can be identified with some precision?

* Q60: Does the repository interface divide investment ranges into small increments so that trends and ad pricing strategies can be identified with some precision?

Grade Composition

Of the 60 parameters evaluated, 14 were considered essential for conducting systematic and methodologically rigorous analyses of data on advertisements. These parameters were grouped into six special criteria that make up 60% of the score, so that each special criterion corresponds to 10% of the final score. The other 46 parameters make up the remaining 40% of the total score and are worth 0.87 points for each positive evaluation. Each of these 46 parameters has the same weight in the composition of the final score, so that dimensions with more parameters have greater weights. Some of the parameters can be evaluated positively, partially positively or negatively. In cases where the platform has a partially positive evaluation, the score is 50% of the value attributed to the positive evaluation.

For the special criteria, we group together parameters that we consider fundamental – and from which many others on our evaluation form derive – for conducting systematic and rigorous analyses based on digital advertising

data. For years, specialized academic literature has been pointing out the shortcomings and limitations of online advertising transparency repositories (Bossetta, 2020; Edelson; Lauinger; McCoy, 2020; Leerssen et al., 2019; Santini et al., 2024a) and many of the concerns expressed in these studies have in fact been met by the regulation of digital services in the European Union. For example, the DSA requires big tech companies to make an API and query interface for their advertising repositories available, through which it should be possible to access information on the targeting of advertising pieces (European Union, 2022a; United States of America, 2023). Following in the same direction, the recent Resolution 23.732/2024 of the TSE (Brazil, 2024) requires that online advertising service providers that display political ads provide APIs and similar interfaces, but that they are navigable and searchable by different parameters such as the advertiser’s name and keywords. In some way, we include these aspects in the formulation of the special criteria.

Combination Answer Key

P		P		CE
✓	+	✓	=	✓
✓	+	/	=	/
/	+	/	=	/
/	+	✗	=	✗
✗	+	✗	=	✗

To score points on a special criterion, the platform must meet, at least partially, all of the parameters that it comprises. If a platform is evaluated negatively on any of the parameters that make up a special criterion, it will not receive any of the possible points. Similarly, to receive all applicable points, the platform must be evaluated positively on all of the parameters that make up a special criterion. Thus, a partial evaluation on one of the parameters on the special criterion, together with another positive evaluation, means only half of the expected points will be awarded.

Combination Answer Key

Dn		Dn		CE
✓	ou	✓	=	✓
✓	ou	/	=	/
/	ou	/	=	/
/	ou	✗	=	✗
✗	ou	✗	=	✗

In addition, two special criteria have two determinants (D1 and D2) that are analyzed independently to define their final evaluation. One of the determinants consists of two questions, while the other consists of only one. If at least one determinant (Dn) receives a positive or partial evaluation, this means the special criterion will receive the expected score in full or by half. In the evaluation of the special criterion in cases where both determinants receive negative evaluations, no points are awarded.

Therefore, the **weighted calculation of the grade** is made based on:

1. **10 points corresponding to special criterion #1:** “Does the social media platform offer API to collect content data from all types of published ads?”

Only platforms that allow access to and systematic retrieval of data on all types of ads through their API will score points in this criterion. Among the data that can be retrieved, we understand that data related to the content of the ads is essential for a satisfactory analysis of them using external tools. To score points in this special criterion, parameters *Q34 must be met positively or partially (Does the social media platform provide an API to access and collect updated data on all types of published ads?)* [Accessibility] and *Q1 (Does the API provide updated data on the content of the ad?)* [Completeness].

2. **10 points for special criterion #2:** “Does the social media platform API provide demographic and geographic data about the audience that received the ad or about the targeting criteria defined by the advertiser?”.

Only platforms that allow access to segmentation data defined by advertisers or to information about the target audience through an API are awarded points for this criterion. To be awarded points for this criterion, the platform must meet or partially meet parameters *Q2 (Does the API return updated demographic data about the audience to which the ad was displayed?)* [Completeness] and *P3 (Does the API provide updated geographic data about the audience to which the ad was displayed?)* [Completeness], which make up D1, or parameter *Q4 (Does the API retrieve all data about the target audience segmentation defined by the advertiser?)* [Completeness], which makes up D2. We believe that making audience segmentation criteria available through an API is the main way to enable understanding of how

the platform’s microsegmentation algorithms operate, as well as to understand advertisers’ strategies. This factor is also essential for understanding the target audience, allowing for the identification of cases of discriminatory or abusive segmentation, for example.

3. **10 points corresponding to special criterion #3:** “Does the social media platform API allow you to filter data by search terms and advertisers of interest?”

Only platforms that offer efficient mechanisms for locating and filtering ads through an API are awarded points for this criterion. To be awarded points for this criterion, the platform must meet or partially meet parameters *Q40 (Does the API provide means for retrieving ads based on search terms?)* [Accessibility] and *Q51 (Is it possible to filter ad data in the API by page or advertiser profile?)* [Relevance]. The search and filtering tools provided by the transparency tools of social media platforms impose several limitations on the development of consistent search designs, preventing the location of ads relevant to a given purpose.

4. **10 points corresponding to special criterion no. 4:** “Does the social media platform provide an interface to its advertising repository, through which it is possible to access its content and extract its data?”.

Only platforms that allow access to and retrieval of data on all types of ads through the ad repository interface are awarded points for this criterion. We understand that it is not enough to simply make ad content available and display it on a web interface, but also data must be able to be collected and then analysed using external tools. To receive points for this special criterion, the social media platform must positively or partially meet parameters *Q42 (Does the social media platform provide an ad repository interface to access updated data on all types of published ads?)* [Accessibility] and *Q43 (Is it possible to extract the data displayed in the repository interface?)* [Accessibility].

5. **10 points corresponding to special criterion no. 5:** “Does the repository interface of the social media platform provide demographic and geographic data about the audience that received the advertisement or about the targeting criteria defined by the advertiser?”

Só Only platforms that allow access to segmentation data defined by advertisers or to information about the target audience through the ad repository interface are awarded points for this criterion. To be awarded points for this criterion, the platform must meet or partially meet parameters *Q12 (Does the repository interface display updated demographic data about the target audience to which the ad was displayed?)* [Completeness] and *Q13 (Does the repository interface display updated geographic data about the target audience to which the ad was displayed?)* [Completeness], which make up D1, or parameter *Q14 (Does the repository interface retrieve all data about the target audience segmentation defined by the advertiser?)* [Completeness], which makes up D2. We believe that making audience segmentation criteria available in the interface is the main way to enable understanding of how the platform’s microsegmentation algorithms operate, as well as advertisers’ strategies. This factor is also essential for understanding the target audience, allowing for the identification of cases of discriminatory or abusive segmentation, for example.

6. **10 points for special criterion #6:** “Does the social media platform repository interface allow you to filter data by search terms and advertiser interest?”.

Only platforms that offer efficient mechanisms to locate and filter ads through their ad repository interface will score points in this criterion. We understand that it is essential to locate ads and advertisers relevant to a purpose so that advertising services are auditable, since

transparency tools are commonly designed in a way that limits the retrieval of data of interest to the researcher. To score points in this criterion, the platform must positively or partially meet parameters *P44 (Is it possible to retrieve current ads and updated data for all ads through search terms in the repository interface?)* [Accessibility] and *P54 (Is it possible to filter ad data in the repository interface by page or advertiser profile?)* [Relevance].

7. **40 points** correspond to the remaining 46 parameters. The score for each platform corresponds to the sum of points obtained in parameters with **YES** or **PARTIALLY YES** answers in relation to the total parameters of that dimension, to the nearest one decimal place.

The calculation of the final grade for each platform is represented by:

$$\frac{ceTotal + (0,5 * ceParcial)}{ce} * 60 + \frac{cpTotal + (0,5 * cpParcial)}{cp} * 40$$

Where:

ceTotal is the number of special criteria fully met;

ceParcial is the number of special criteria partially met;

ce is the number of special criteria applicable⁴;

cpTotal is the number of standard criteria fully met;

cpParcial is the number of standard criteria partially met;

cp is the number of applicable standard criteria⁵;

⁴In the **Telegram** assessment, we disregarded the six evaluation parameters that make up special criteria 3 and 6 and readjusted the rest of the calculations around this decision.

⁵In **Google's** assessment, we disregarded two of the remaining standard criteria and re-adjusted the rest of the calculations around this decision.

Graphic Representation of the Grade



API: COLLECTION
WEIGHT: 10 PTS
PARAMETERS: 2

API: SEGMENTATION
WEIGHT: 10 PTS
PARAMETERS: 3

API: FILTER
WEIGHT: 10 PTS
PARAMETERS: 2

INTERFACE: COLLECTION
WEIGHT: 10 PTS
PARAMETERS: 2

INTERFACE: SEGMENTATION
WEIGHT: 10 PTS
PARAMETERS: 3

INTERFACE: FILTER
WEIGHT: 10 PTS
PARAMETERS: 2

COMPLETENESS
WEIGHT: 12,17 PTS
PARAMETERS: 14

COMPLIANCE
WEIGHT: 10,43 PTS
PARAMETERS: 12

ACCESSIBILITY
WEIGHT: 5,22 PTS
PARAMETERS: 6

CONSISTANCY
WEIGHT: 5,22 PTS
PARAMETERS: 6

RELEVANCE
WEIGHT: 3,48 PTS
PARAMETERS: 4

ACCURACY
WEIGHT: 3,48 PTS
PARAMETERS: 4

Levels of Data Transparency

To facilitate the interpretation of the scores obtained, the index classifies the analyzed platforms into five categories:

Ideal transparency (81 a 100 pontos)

A robust API and ad repository interface is provided, allowing the exploration and collection of data with satisfactory completeness on all types of ads that circulated in Brazil. Transparency reports are published, detailing the irregular ad moderation activities carried out by the platform itself, at the request of governments, the courts and user complaints in the country.

Satisfactory transparency (61 a 80 pontos)

In addition to data on advertisements considered political, electoral and/or socially relevant, the platforms also archive the content of general commercial advertisements that circulated in Brazil, although the data on these does not present the expected completeness. They publish transparency reports on moderation activities in the country with some frequency.

Regular transparency (41 a 60 pontos)

The platform offers an API and repository interface that allows browsing through archived ad data that circulated in Brazil, but only for pieces considered political, electoral and/or socially relevant. They do not publish transparency reports on their advertising moderation activities in the country.

Precarious transparency (21 a 40 pontos)

Although they provide transparency measures, the platform only allows access to data on ads that are still active at a given time, without archiving previous pieces, making it impossible to discover significant samples of ads that circulated in Brazil. They do not publish periodic transparency reports on their advertising moderation activities in the country.

Irrelevant or null Transparency (0 a 20 pontos)

No measures for accessing data from advertisements served in Brazil are offered, either through a user interface or API, or, when they are available, they only provide outdated data sets with a very low degree of completeness, making any analysis impossible.


Results

None of the platforms evaluated received a *satisfactory* or *ideal score* for transparency measures or access to advertising data and the quality of the data returned. The best evaluation was from **Meta**, with **48.8 points**, an index considered average.


In addition, only **Telegram** scores in the poor range and **LinkedIn** and **Google** fall in the irrelevant or null range. **X/Twitter**, **TikTok**,

Kwai and **Pinterest** do not offer any advertising transparency measures in Brazil and, therefore, do not score in any evaluation parameter.

Below, we will present an overview of what was observed in each platform analyzed. The overview of each platform, divided by dimension, as well as the specific responses and justifications for each evaluation parameter are available in the [Appendix](#).



Data transparency: *Regular*



Meta, whose advertising ecosystem is made up of Facebook, Instagram, Messenger and Audience Network, scored **49.8** points in our evaluation, with its advertising transparency considered **regular**. It is the company with the greatest ad transparency on social media platforms in Brazil.

Its advertising repository, called the Ad Library ([Meta, \[S.d.\]a](#)), is particularly useful for investigating ads that deal with **politics, elections and/or social relevance**. According to the company’s definition, these are “sensitive topics that are heavily debated, may influence the outcome of an election or result from/ relate to existing or proposed legislation”, such as the economy, civil rights, education, immigration and weapons ([Meta, \[N.d.\]i](#)). The data and content of these ads can be viewed in the interface ([Q42](#)) and extracted both by the interface ([Q43](#)) and by the repository’s API ([Q1](#) and [Q34](#)), which leads to partial scoring in [Special Criterion 1](#) and [Special Criterion 4](#).

Ads falling into this category are archived for seven years in the repository and can be searched both by keywords ([Q40](#) and [Q44](#)) and by advertiser pages ([Q51](#) and [Q54](#)), which leads to Meta’s partial score in [Special Criterion 3](#) and [Special Criterion 6](#). Broadcast information,

such as circulation period ([Q8](#) and [Q18](#)) and demographic ([Q2](#) and [Q12](#)) and geographic data of the audience reached ([Q3](#) and [Q13](#)) are made available in its user interface and API, making it score partially in [Special Criterion 2](#) and [Special Criterion 5](#).


The major problem with Meta’s transparency lies precisely in the distinction between general ads and political, electoral and/or socially relevant ads. Due to this difficulty and the inconsistency in ad classification, Meta scores partially on **21 evaluation parameters**, including those that form 5 of the 6 special criteria. It is worth noting that, in the European Union, due to the DSA, **data from all ads broadcast** on Meta’s platforms in the European Union are required to be more transparent and can be retrieved through the repository API for up to one year after the end of their broadcast ([Santini et al., 2024a](#)).

Ads that are not categorized as political, electoral, and/or socially relevant can only be viewed in the ad repository UI while they are being served ([Q42](#)), but the specific information about the serving is not public. Neither the API nor the ad repository UI allows for the extraction of data for these ads ([Q34](#) and [Q43](#)).

Another problem with Meta’s advertising transparency policy concerns the lack of

transparency reports on the moderation of ads served on the company’s ecosystem platforms ([P30](#), [P31](#), [P32](#) and [P33](#)).

Data transparency: *Precarious*



Telegram’s ad transparency score of **22.8** is considered **precarious**. Telegram’s advertising is very specific: according to its policies and guidelines ([Telegram, \[N.d.\]a](#)), each ad must consist of text and a link button that must redirect users to other Telegram channels, so links to external websites are not allowed ([Telegram, \[N.d.\]f](#)). Furthermore, ads can only be run in public channels with more than 1,000 members and are limited to 160 characters with spaces.

Telegram is an exception among the platforms analyzed because it does not offer microtargeting options: once an ad is directed to a public channel, all its members can view it ([Telegram, \[N.d.\]e](#)).

The platform allows you to retrieve specific information about ads using the same API used to collect user-generated data, requiring prior knowledge of the channels to which the ads were directed ([P1](#) and [P34](#)). The limited data made available by the API includes the content of the ads and the URL for the redirected

⁶ For the final calculation of Telegram’s score, we disregarded six parameters for completeness: Q2) “Does the API return up-to-date demographic data about the audience to which the ad was displayed?”, Q3) “Does the API provide up-to-date geographic data about the audience to which the ad was displayed?”, Q4) “Does the API retrieve all data about the target audience segmentation defined by the advertiser?”, Q12) “Does the repository interface display up-to-date demographic data about the audience to which the ad was displayed?”, Q13) “Does the repository interface display up-to-date geographic data about the audience to which the ad was displayed?”, and Q14) “Does the repository interface retrieve all data about the target audience segmentation defined by the advertiser?”. The parameters were disregarded because the platform does not provide advertisers with the possibility of micro-segmenting their audience. Therefore, Telegram’s evaluation was based on 54 parameters in total and four of the six special criteria, which then became worth 15 points each.


channels, which gives the platform a full score in **Special Criterion 1**.

One negative point that deserves attention is that the Telegram API only allows the collection of ads that are currently active on a channel known and monitored by the researcher, not allowing the collection of historical data on inactive ads (Q5). Therefore, the platform does not provide any possibility of filtering ad data through its API, which makes it lose points in **Special Criterion 2**. **The platform also does not provide an ad repository interface for browsing advertising data (Q42), meaning it does not score in Special Criterion 3 and Special Criterion 4.**

Telegram also performs poorly in the **compliance** dimension, as its API documentation is not available natively in Portuguese (Q29) and the method for retrieving ad data is not clearly explained and exemplified in it (Q27). In addition, **the platform does not provide transparency reports** on advertising moderation in Brazilian (Q30, Q31, Q32 and Q33).

in LinkedIn

Data transparency: *Precarious*



Scoring **18.3 points**, LinkedIn’s advertising data transparency is considered irrelevant or non-existent, despite offering both an interface (Q42) and an API (Q34) to access its ad repository.

The repository interface does not provide any option for **extracting ad data for external analysis (Q43)**, which means that the minimum requirement for **Special Criterion 4** is not met.

The API fulfills this function, allowing users and researchers to download ad data made available in the repository. However it does not enable data to be recovered on text and visual content of the ads (Q1), just links for online access, which means that the platform also does not comply with what is expected in **Special Criterion 1**.

The platform allows users to browse data on **all ads displayed on it over the last 365 days**. It also allows users to search for ads based on keywords (Q40 and Q44), and a **date filter** can be applied (Q10 and Q20). However, it is not possible to filter the data based on the selection of advertising pages of interest, only searching for terms present in their names (Q51 and Q54), which means that the platform does not reach the minimum score for **Special Criterion 3** and **Special Criterion 6**.


The data available for each ad is extremely limited, both via API and interface: only the content of the ads can be accessed, as well as information about the advertiser’s page and

the entity responsible for its payment. Data on engagement (Q9 and Q19), impressions (Q57 and P59), investment (Q58 and Q60), and period of broadcast (Q8 and Q18) are not public in the Brazilian version of the tool. Data on the **demographic and geographic segmentation** of the audience that viewed the ad (Q2, Q3, Q12 and Q13) are also not made available, meaning the platform scores no points in **Special Criterion 2** and **Special Criterion 5**. It is worth noting that data related to the volume of impressions, segmentation criteria, and circulation period are made available for ads that circulated in the European Union, in order to meet the criteria defined by the DSA (LinkedIn, [N.d.jg]).

Finally, although LinkedIn presents a report with information on the moderation of content that violated its terms of use and on requests for moderation and sending of data made by government entities (LinkedIn, [N.d.jf]), the report does not indicate the reasons for moderating advertisements on the platform (Q30, Q31, Q32 and Q33).

Google

Data transparency: *Precarious*



Google scored 8.2 points, its ad transparency considered *irrelevant or null* due to recent changes that reduced the availability of ad data circulating on its platforms in Brazil.

Until the beginning of 2024, it was possible to extract data from political and electoral advertisements broadcast on their platforms through the **API Google BigQuery**, as well as viewing and collecting them through the **Google Ads Transparency Center** user interface. However, in May that year, the company banned the serving of political and electoral ads

(Waltenberg, 2024) and, therefore, it is only possible to collect data on political and electoral advertisements broadcast on the company’s platforms in Brazil up to the end of April 2024. However, there is evidence that political advertisements continue to circulate without due moderation and transparency (NetLab UFRJ, 2024d).

As a result, the company scored poorly on all criteria for the collection of current ads and updated data programmatically, starting with the availability of an API that returns this data (Q34). For the same reason, Google does not score on any of the special criteria used in the index evaluation.

In addition to political and electoral ads, Google’s Ads Transparency Center archives ads promoted by verified advertisers for up to one year after their end date. However, since Google does not also archive ads promoted by unverified advertisers, we believe that its repository provides an insufficient measure of transparency for systematic investigations, given the unauditable sample of ads whose representativeness cannot be assured (Q42).

Like other companies, Google does not offer the same transparency measures and access to advertising data in Brazil as it does in countries in the Global North. In the European Union, the company archives ads served by all advertisers,

regardless of whether they are verified or not. Its repository includes all ads circulating in the bloc, as well as the data required by the DSA (Richardson; O’Connor, 2023).

It is not possible to access the placement information, such as engagement (Q9 and Q19), impressions (Q57 and Q59) and investment (Q58 and Q60), for ads driven by verified advertisers that are available in the repository interface only the final placement date and – the ad content.

Despite the limitations, we still evaluate the technical parameters of the API, which do not depend on updated data for this purpose. Thus, the platform scores in accessibility thanks to free access (Q35) and no limit on the creation of API tokens (Q37); API responses are also consistent (Q47) and coherent (Q48) with the parameters used in the requests.

One of the biggest technical problems in retrieving ads through the Google BigQuery API (Q40) and the Google Ads Transparency Center user interface (Q44) is that they cannot be searched using keywords. Only ads using the names with which advertisers registered on the company’s network (Q51 and Q54) can be found, which significantly hinders the identification of content of interest – especially irregular content (NetLab UFRJ, 2024d).

⁷ To calculate Google’s final score, we disregarded two parameters on completeness: P11) “Does the API clearly and unambiguously signal whether ads were placed by verified or unverified advertisers?” and P21) “Does the repository interface clearly and unambiguously signal whether ads were placed by verified or unverified advertisers?” These parameters were disregarded because Google only archives ads driven by verified advertisers in its advertising repository. Therefore, Google’s assessment was based on 58 parameters in total.

X/Twitter

Data transparency: Null

Key:

- API: COLLECTION 0 FROM 10 PONTOS
- API: SEGMENTATION 0 FROM 10 POINTS
- API: FILTER 0 FROM 10 POINTS
- INTERFACE: COLLECTION 0 FROM 10 POINTS
- INTERFACE: SEGMENTATION 0 FROM 10 POINTS
- INTERFACE: FILTER 0 FROM 10 POINTS
- COMPLETENESS 0 DE 12.17 PONTOS
- COMPLIANCE 0 FROM 10.43 POINTS
- ACCESSIBILITY 0 FROM 5.22 POINTS
- CONSISTENCY 0 FROM 5.22 POINTS
- RELEVANCE 0 FROM 3.48 POINTS
- ACCURACY 0 FROM 3.48 POINTS



X/Twitter is one of the four platforms analyzed that did not score in our advertising transparency analysis, the ATI, with an advertising data transparency of *null*. In addition to not providing an API (Q34) or interface (Q42) of the ad repository for collecting and analyzing advertising data in Brazil, X/Twitter does not publicly provide any transparency reports on

the removal of ads and the suspension of illegal, irregular and/or abusive advertisers (Q30, Q31, Q32 and Q33). In order to meet the demands imposed by the DSA, the company only provides an API and a repository interface for ads that circulated in member countries of the European Union (X/Twitter, [N.d.]).

TikTok

Data transparency: Null

Key:

- API: COLLECTION 0 FROM 10 PONTOS
- API: SEGMENTATION 0 FROM 10 POINTS
- API: FILTER 0 FROM 10 POINTS
- INTERFACE: COLLECTION 0 FROM 10 POINTS
- INTERFACE: SEGMENTATION 0 FROM 10 POINTS
- INTERFACE: FILTER 0 FROM 10 POINTS
- COMPLETENESS 0 DE 12.17 PONTOS
- COMPLIANCE 0 FROM 10.43 POINTS
- ACCESSIBILITY 0 FROM 5.22 POINTS
- CONSISTENCY 0 FROM 5.22 POINTS
- RELEVANCE 0 FROM 3.48 POINTS
- ACCURACY 0 FROM 3.48 POINTS



TikTok’s advertising data transparency is considered null because the platform does not score in any of the evaluation parameters proposed in the ATI, as it does not provide a repository interface (Q42) or API (Q34) for collecting data from ads displayed to Brazilian users.

Meanwhile, for ads served in countries in the European Union, the United Kingdom and Switzerland, TikTok provides a repository interface called the Commercial Content Library (TikTok, [N.d.]), in which it archives data on all ads that have been viewed at least once and that have been published since October 1, 2022.



The Commercial Content Library also allows data retrieval via an API (TikTok, [N.d.]).

Although the platform provides minimally detailed transparency reports for user-generated data (TikTok, 2024), the same does not occur for advertising data.

The platform does not meet the minimum expectations in any parameter regarding the disclosure and detailing of transparency reports, as it only reports the total number of ads removed globally, without specifying the location and reasons for the removal (Q30, Q31, Q32 and Q33).



Data transparency: Null




Kwai also does not score points in any dimension and its advertising data transparency is considered null. The platform does not provide an API (Q34) or interface (Q42) for accessing and collecting ads in Brazil or anywhere else in the world.

In April 2024, the company launched the Political and Electoral Ads Library (Kwai, [N.d.]) in Brazil, through which it was possible to

view a few pieces related to the 2022 general elections. However, about a month later, it decided to prohibit the broadcasting of political ads and stopped updating the repository (Nóbrega, 2024). During the period in which it was active, the library did not allow the use of keywords in the search for ads (Q44), limiting its search only to the name with which the advertisers registered (Q54).



Data transparency: Null



Pinterest’s advertising data transparency is considered null because the platform does not offer an ad repository interface (Q42) or API (Q34)) in Brazil.

The platform allows you to consult only advertisements that have circulated in European Union countries through a repository interface (Pinterest, [N.d.]). Even in these countries, Pinterest does not offer a way to access the repository via an API (Mozilla Foundation; Check First, 2024). According to the platform’s documentation (Pinterest, [N.d.]); Pinterest, [N.d.]), the endpoints to access the ad repository are only available in version 4 of the

Pinterest Business API. However, this version of the API was replaced by version 5 in 2022 (Pinterest, 2022) and in 2024 it was completely discontinued, no longer available for use (Pinterest, [N.d.]).

Furthermore, Pinterest does not detail the measures applied to ads in its transparency reports and does not specify all results by country (Q30, Q31, Q32 and Q33). According to the platform, “ad policies are applied differently than organic content and are not included in this transparency report” (Pinterest, [N.d.]).

Good and Bad Practices in Providing Data About Ads

Based on the evidence observed in the analysis of each platform, we present an overview of measures, **divided by data quality dimensions** that should be widely adopted or avoided in order to guarantee a satisfactory **level of transparency and availability of data for research**.

Good Practices That Can Be Replicated

Completeness:

Meta is the only company to provide data on the geographic and demographic segmentation of the audience that views an ad through its API and ad repository interface, although the data is limited to ads classified as political, electoral and/or socially relevant. Through **Meta**'s API and ad repository interface, it is also possible to retrieve data on the advertisers, funders and boosting period of ads considered political, electoral and/or socially relevant.

Through its API and ad repository interface, **LinkedIn** provides information about inactive ads for up to a year after their last display, advertisers who have boosted content on its platform, and funders who have paid for any ads, while **Meta** only provides this information for political, electoral, and/or socially relevant ads.

Telegram's API is the only one analyzed that allows the extraction of data relating to the content displayed to its users from all types of advertisements broadcast on its public channels, while **Meta** only allows the information about the content of political, electoral and/or socially relevant advertisements to be extracted.

Compliance:

Meta, Telegram, LinkedIn and Google make their ad repository API documentation available in open access with clear instructions, but only **LinkedIn** has translated it fully into Portuguese. **Meta, Telegram, LinkedIn and Google** return data in a standardized format through their APIs, following internationally used standards.

Additionally, **Meta, LinkedIn and Telegram** APIs ensure stability when monitoring digital advertising.

Accessibility:

Only **Meta and LinkedIn** offer an ad repository interface that allows interested parties to consult the updated content and data of all types of ads according to search terms. However, if an ad has not been classified as political, electoral and/or socially relevant on **Meta**, it can only be consulted while it is still being displayed on their platforms. As for ease of access to content, both offer the possibility of searching for ads by keywords.

Telegram and LinkedIn provide a free API that allows you to collect up-to-date data on all types of published ads. While **LinkedIn**'s repository API provides access to ads that have been circulated in the last year, **Telegram**'s API provides access to active ads on a given channel – that is, it is only possible to collect ads on previously known **Telegram** channels.

Meta also provides an API for its advertising repository, limiting access and data extraction to political, electoral and/or socially relevant ads that were broadcast in the last seven years.

Consistency:

Ad URLs returned by **LinkedIn**'s repository API do not expire after they are collected. In addition, the platform keeps data accessible for ads removed for violating terms of use. **Meta** stands out for its transparency only on ads removed with content classified as political, electoral and/or socially relevant. Both platforms flag removals, and also allow for viewing the content of moderated ads.

Meta, Telegram, LinkedIn and Google return consistent data, that is, requests made to the APIs at different times or by different users retrieve practically identical data.

Relevance:

Only **Meta** makes it possible to retrieve updated ad data based on the selection of advertiser pages of interest, both through the API and through the interface of its ad repository.

Furthermore, both the API and the **Meta** repository interface allow updated data on political, electoral and/or socially relevant ads to be filtered according to location in Brazil where the users to whom they were displayed are located.

Accuracy:

None of the platforms analyzed scored in this dimension. However, it is worth noting that good accuracy practices result in more precise data. Applying the appropriate granularity to the data, according to the available impression and investment ranges, is a way to ensure accuracy.

Bad Practices That Should Be Avoided

Completeness:

Limiting relevant data on content, impressions, investment, funder and targeting to political, electoral or socially relevant ads leads to serious completeness issues. **Meta** loses many points in this dimension by not offering complete data for general ads, but only for those classified as political, electoral and/or socially relevant.

In the case of **Google** and **LinkedIn**, the APIs do not return the textual content or information about media inserted in ads, only URLs for querying the content of the pieces in the repository interface. Google’s API only returns political and electoral ads broadcast in Brazil up until the end of April 2024, when the company declared that it would no longer allow political ads on its platforms in the country.

None of the platforms analyzed allow the recovery of data on user engagement or interactions with the ads they were impacted by.

Compliance:

None of the platforms analyzed provide transparency reports on ad moderation which are specific to Brazil and published periodically.

Furthermore, up until the time of the analysis, conducted throughout the first half of 2024, synthetic content produced with the help of Artificial Intelligence did not receive any signaling from any of the platforms analyzed, either via API or via the ad repository interface.

This may have changed with Resolution No. 23,732/2024 of the TSE for the elections in the second half of 2024. Therefore, this aspect should be reassessed in the next edition of this index.

The instability in the availability of advertising data in Brazil also harmed Google’s score, which announced the suspension of updates to its repository of political and electoral ads with just one week’s notice, without offering any other means for the programmatic and systematic collection of data of public interest.

Accessibility:

In addition to not offering an API or an interface for their ad repositories in Brazil, **X/Twitter**, **TikTok** and **Pinterest** also adopt different policies from those implemented in the European Union. In the countries of the European bloc, X/Twitter and TikTok offer both an interface and an API for accessing their ad repository, while Pinterest offers an interface. Kwai does not provide means of accessing its ad repository in any country. In Brazil, this platform tested the launch of an interface for their ad repository, which was deactivated in less than a month.

We would like to emphasize that, although Google’s ad repository is accessible via an API, it only allows the extraction of data from political-electoral ads broadcast in Brazil up until the end of April 2024.

Another limitation of **Google** is the restriction of the interface to content from verified advertisers published in the last year, giving access to only a restricted and non-representative sample of the data. By leaving data about ads published by unverified advertisers out of the repository, Google makes the consumer even more vulnerable to fraudulent ads. In addition, it is not possible to search for ads based on keywords, either through the API or through the interface of its ad repository.

Consistency:

Meta’s ad repository API documentation is unclear about which ad fields are used to search for the parameters specified in the request. The API and its repository interface do not indicate in which ad components the specified keywords were found, which makes it impossible to analyze the consistency between the search parameters and the results delivered.

A similar situation occurs with **LinkedIn**: although it is possible to define a time interval to filter the search for ads through the API and through the interface of its ad repository, data on the period in which the ads were displayed is not retrieved, which prevents assessment of appropriate and coherent applications of filters indicated in the request.

While Google’s API does return data on ads removed for violating the company’s advertising terms, in the case of political and electoral ads that ran through the end of April 2024, it doesn’t clearly flag exactly when this happens in the results. Additionally, its ad repository interface doesn’t allow users to access the content of moderated ads.

The lack of data on removed or moderated ads is also a consistency issue in the case of the Telegram API.

Relevance:

LinkedIn’s API and Ad Repository interface do not allow you to filter advertising data by the geographic location targeted by the advertiser or by the location of the users who actually viewed an ad. They also do not allow you to retrieve ad data based on a specific advertiser’s referral, which both **Meta**’s API and Ad Repository interface allow.

Although **Google**’s repository allows filtering data from political and electoral ads according to geographic filters, these have not been updated since May 2024. Disabling this functionality constitutes a latent bad practice of reducing the transparency of data on advertising.

It is important to note that none of the platforms offer ad search filters by thematic categories defined by advertisers. In the case of **Meta**, for example, users can filter ad data according to categories such as housing, credit and employment in European countries and the United States.

Accuracy:

No platform scores on accuracy parameters. Currently, only Meta returns updated data on investment and impressions received by political, electoral and/or socially relevant ads through its API and repository interface. However, this data is returned in ranges that are insufficient for understanding pricing and audience segmentation strategies.

Recommendations

The performance of all of the platforms evaluated in the 1st edition of the API highlights the need and urgency for improvements in the transparency of online advertising in Brazil. The main points for improvement can be grouped into **six recommendations**:

01 Enable collecting public data on advertising

It is essential that up-to-date **data for all ads served** on social media platforms be made available through **APIs and repository interfaces that are public and free to use**. While APIs provide programmatic access to data, allowing collection processes to be customized and automated and scaled, the user interface makes it easy for interested parties to use the repository, even if they have little or no technical or programming knowledge.

We do not recommend differentiating political, electoral and/or socially relevant ads from others because this classification by platforms has proven to be imprecise, arbitrary and inefficient, consequently hindering transparency. This differentiation in the transparency of political ads compared to others has effectively prevented social media platforms from providing full transparency to their advertising services,

rather than working against the manipulation of public opinion and protecting the consumer.

Currently, X/Twitter, TikTok, Kwai and Pinterest do not offer any official means of collecting data on ads displayed to Brazilian users. This is the main reason why none of these platforms scored in the parameters evaluated by the ATI. Google scores low due to the extremely poor availability of data on ads circulating on its platforms. Although they offer an API and interface for its repository, the company provides insufficient and outdated data samples on ads, which are therefore incomplete and irrelevant for research and consultation.

02 Increase quality and standardization of the data provided

Meta and LinkedIn, which **provide an API and an interface to their repositories**, deliver data with several problems, especially regarding completeness. LinkedIn, for example, does not provide data on impressions, investment and demographic or geographic targeting for any advertisement, while Meta only does so in the case of advertisements considered political, electoral and/or socially relevant.

To improve the overall level of data quality, it is essential that social media platforms follow internationally accepted standards and norms, such as ISO 8000, and make data available in quantities and variety equal to or very close to that of their advertising databases. The main regulatory projects for digital platforms, approved or under debate, such as the DSA in the European Union, do not address data quality and standardization. However, it is essential that Brazil seizes the opportunity to learn from the limitations detected in proposals from other countries and position itself at the forefront of the discussion on the importance of transparency linked to data quality.

Micro-targeting audiences for content distribution is a central feature of ads delivered on social media platforms. Therefore, audience profiling data must be accessible, complete, and accurate to ensure transparency, auditability, and consumer protection. Transparency should be improved regarding ads and advertisers that have been moderated or suspended. Even if the content of the post removed for violating the rules is restricted, making this data public and accessible is an important measure to protect Brazilian consumers. In addition to ad moderation, it is important to make data publicly available on user engagement with ads so that it is possible to assess the impact of this content on public policies and the decisions of Brazilian consumers.

03

Expand the capabilities of ad repositories

Providing a variety of filtering and selection options for ad data

in repositories is essential to increasing transparency in online advertising. More than offering a variety of possible filters for retrieving ad data, ad repository APIs and interfaces should prioritize consistency and coherence in data delivery. Incorporating filters for a more refined search in ad content and data has a positive impact on the relevance of the data retrieved and its suitability for the intended purposes of the request.

In view of this, offering keyword searches and advertiser selection is essential for collecting relevant data, both through APIs and ad repository interfaces. Applying time filters to retrieve ad data is also recommended, as it allows for longitudinal and public interest analyses, which are essential for developing research on the social impacts

of advertising. In addition, it is essential that APIs and repository interfaces allow for the application of geographic location filters, according to the profiling criteria determined by advertisers or the impacted audience.

04

Increase quality and standardisation for the available data

The API usage guidelines should be publicly available, easily accessible, translated into Portuguese and provide clear rules for their use. Thus, the official API documentation

must list the possible errors for each available endpoint and offer representative and understandable examples of the requests available to obtain the data.

05

Strengthen verification policies for ad serving

Platforms should only allow advertisements created by **advertisers who have undergone rigorous verification processes**, mainly as a way of protecting consumers from fraudulent

ads. Ultimately, the lack of control and verification systems for advertisers cannot be used as an argument for the lack of transparency in advertising displayed on social media platforms.

06

Disclose transparency reports on moderation of advertisements circulating in Brazil

We recommend that all the platforms analyzed ensure the full disclosure of two types of information: the governance policies and practices of advertising services in Brazil and the inventories of ads that were removed from circulation, accompanied by metadata and reasons that motivated their moderation. **It is essential that these reports be published periodically**, with detailed data on the volume of ads removed and advertisers suspended, as

well as on the different types of irregularities identified. All action removing ads defined as irregular by the platform's own guidelines should be signaled, and the moderation activity carried out at the request of the courts or government entities in Brazil should be indicated. This should be accompanied by the justification for such action, giving information on the location of the users impacted by the advertisements.

Apendix I:

Overview of Assessment by Platform

- 

Indicates a positive rating for all listings
- 

Indicates a negative evaluation
- 

Indicates a partial assessment (positive only for political, electoral and/or socially relevant ads)
- 

Indicates that the parameter is not applicable to the evaluated platform
- 

Positive evaluation only for political, electoral and/or socially relevant advertisements is applicable in this criterion.

Completeness									
Evaluation parameters									
* Q1	Does the API provide up-to-date data about ad content? (Special Criterion 1)								
* Q2	Does the API return up-to-date demographic data about the audience the ad was shown to? (Special Criterion 2)								
* Q3	Does the API provide up-to-date geographic data about the audience the ad was shown to? (Special Criterion 2)								
* Q4	Does the API retrieve all data about the advertiser-defined audience targeting? (Special Criterion 2)								
* P5	Does the API return updated data for inactive ads?								
* Q6	Does the API provide up-to-date data on advertisers who have served ads on the social media platform?								

 Indicates a positive rating for all listings	 Indicates a negative evaluation	 Indicates a partial assessment (positive only for political, electoral and/or socially relevant ads)	 Indicates that the parameter is not applicable to the evaluated platform	 Positive evaluation only for political, electoral and/or socially relevant advertisements is applicable in this criterion.
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Completeness									
Evaluation parameters									
* Q7	Does the API provide up-to-date data on ad funders?								
* Q8	Does the API provide up-to-date data on the ad boosting period?								
* Q9	Does the API retrieve up-to-date data about user engagement with the ad?								
* Q10	Does the API allow the application of temporal filters to retrieve updated data?								
* Q11	Does the API clearly and unambiguously signal whether ads were placed by verified or unverified advertisers?								
* Q12	Does the repository interface display up-to-date demographic data about the audience the ad was shown to? (Special Criterion 5)								
* Q13	Does the repository interface display up-to-date geographic data about the audience the ad was shown to? (Special Criterion 5)								
* Q14	Does the repository interface retrieve all data about advertiser-defined audience targeting? (Special Criterion 5)								

Completeness									
Evaluation parameters									
* Q15	Does the repository interface provide up-to-date data on inactive ads?								
* Q16	Does the repository interface return up-to-date data about advertisers who have published ads on the social media platform?								
* Q17	Does the repository interface provide up-to-date data on ad funders?								
* Q18	Does the repository interface provide up-to-date data on the ad boosting period?								
* Q19	Does the repository interface retrieve up-to-date data on user engagement with the ad?								
* Q20	Does the repository interface allow the application of temporal filters to retrieve updated data?								
* Q21	Does the repository interface clearly and unambiguously signal whether ads were placed by verified or unverified advertisers?								

Compliance									
Evaluation parameters									
Q22	Is the data acquisition process and the structure in which it is made available by the API stable?								
* Q23	Does the API clearly and unequivocally signal content produced by Artificial Intelligence?								
Q24	Does the API return data in a standardized format?								
* Q25	Does the repository interface clearly and unequivocally signal content produced by Artificial Intelligence?								
Q26	Is the API documentation published and available in open access?								
Q27	Is the provided API documentation written clearly and exemplified?								
P28	Does the documentation clearly describe what the terms of use of the API are?								
Q29	Is the API documentation available natively in Portuguese?								

Compliance								
Evaluation parameters								
Q30 Does the social media platform produce and make detailed transparency reports publicly available, without the need for request and with data on its proactive manual and/or computational moderation activity, so as to prevent illegal, irregular or abusive advertising?								
Q31 Is transparency reporting data about ad moderation activity on the social media platform divided by geographic location?								
Q32 Is the transparency reporting data on the social media platform's ad moderation actions grouped by the type(s) of violation that led to the removal?								
Q33 Do transparency reports on ad moderation specify and present information on requests made by government entities to the social media platform?								

Accessibility								
Evaluation parameters								
* Q34 Does the social media platform provide an API to access and collect updated data on all types of published ads? (Special Criterion)								
Q35 Is API access free?								
Q36 Can tokens for API access be created free of charge?								
Q37 Can new tokens be created to access to the API without a limit on the amount?								
Q38 Does the API provide a form of authentication that allows for simplified automatic renewal of access tokens, without any blocking of data acquisition?								
Q39 Is it possible to extract data directly from the API response?								
* Q40 Does the API provide a means to retrieve ads from search terms? (Special Criterion 3)								
* Q41 Does the API provide a means to retrieve updated data for a specific ad?								

Accessibility								
Evaluation parameters								
* Q42 Does the social media platform provide an ad repository interface to access up-to-date data on all types of published ads? <i>(Special Criterion 4)</i>								
* Q43 Is it possible to extract the data displayed in the repository interface? <i>(Special Criterion 4)</i>								
* Q44 Is it possible to retrieve current announcements and updated data for all announcements using search terms from the repository interface? <i>(Special Criterion 6)</i>								

Consistency								
Parâmetros de avaliação								
* Q45 Does the API indicate when an ad has been removed for violating the social media platform's terms?								
Q46 Does the API return persistent data?								
Q47 Does the API return consistent responses?								

Consistency								
Evaluation parameters								
Q48 Does the API return responses consistent with the parameters and filters used in the request?								
* Q49 Does the repository interface signal when an ad has been removed for violating the social media platform's terms?								
Q50 Does the API retrieve the same data displayed in the repository interface?								

Relevance								
Evaluation parameters								
* Q51 Is it possible to filter advertising data in the API by page or advertiser profile? <i>(Special Criterion 3)</i>								
Q52 Does the API allow for filtering ad data based on its category?								
* Q53 Does the API allow for filtering ad data by geographic location?								
* Q54 Is it possible to filter ad data in the repository interface by page or advertiser profile? <i>(Special Criterion 6)</i>								

Relevance								
Evaluation parameters								
Q55 Does the repository interface allow for filtering ad data based on its category?								
* Q56 Does the repository interface allow for filtering ad data by geographic location?								

Accuracy								
Evaluation parameters								
* Q57 Does the API divide impression ranges by audience segment into small intervals so that trends and audience segmentation strategies can be identified with some precision?								
* Q58 Does the API divide investment bands into small increments that make it possible to identify trends and ad pricing strategies with some precision?								
* Q59 Does the repository interface divide impression ranges by audience segment into small increments so that trends and content segmentation strategies can be identified with some precision?								

Accuracy								
Evaluation parameters								
* Q60 Does the repository interface divide investment ranges into small increments so that trends and ad pricing strategies can be identified with some precision?								

Appendix II:

Overview of Platforms in Special Criteria

- 

Indicates a positive rating for all listings
- 

Indicates a negative evaluation
- 

Indicates a partial assessment (positive only for political, electoral and/or socially relevant ads)
- 

Indicates that the parameter is not applicable to the evaluated platform

 Positive evaluation only for political, electoral and/or socially relevant advertisements is applicable in this criterion.

Special Criterion 1: API - Collection								
Evaluation parameters								
SC1 Does the social media platform offer an API to collect content data from all types of published ads?								
* Q1 Does the API provide up-to-date data about ad content? (Completeness)								
* Q34 Does the social media platform provide an API to access and collect updated data on all types of published ads? (Accessibility)								

 Indicates a positive rating for all listings	 Indicates a negative evaluation	 Indicates a partial assessment (positive only for political, electoral and/or socially relevant ads)	 Indicates that the parameter is not applicable to the evaluated platform	 Positive evaluation only for political, electoral and/or socially relevant advertisements is applicable in this criterion.
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Special Criterion 2: API - Data Segmentation								
Evaluation parameters								
SC2 Does the social media platform API provide demographic and geographic data about the audience that received the ad or about the targeting criteria defined by the advertiser?								
* Q2 Does the API return up-to-date demographic data about the audience the ad was shown to? (Completeness)								
* Q3 Does the API provide up-to-date geographic data about the audience the ad was shown to? (Completeness)								
* Q4 Does the API retrieve all data about the advertiser-defined audience targeting? (Completeness)								

Special Criterion 3: API - Search Filters

Evaluation parameters								
SC3 Does the social media platform API allow you to filter data by search terms and advertisers of interest?								
* Q40 Does the API provide a means to retrieve ads from search terms? (Accessibility)								
* Q51 Is it possible to filter advertising data in the API by page or advertiser profile? (Relevance)								

Special Criterion 4: Interface - Collection

Evaluation parameters								
SC4 Does the social media platform provide an interface to its ad repository, through which content can be accessed and data can be extracted?								
* Q42 Does the social media platform provide an ad repository interface to access up-to-date data on all types of published ads? (Accessibility)								

Special Criterion 4: Interface - Collection

Evaluation parameters								
* Q43 Is it possible to extract the data displayed in the repository interface? (Accessibility)								

Special Criterion 5: Interface - Segmentation Data

Evaluation parameters								
SC5 Does the social media platform repository interface provide demographic and geographic data about the audience that received the advertisement or about the targeting criteria defined by the advertiser?								
* Q12 Does the repository interface display up-to-date demographic data about the audience the ad was shown to? (Completeness)								
* Q13 Does the repository interface display up-to-date geographic data about the audience the ad was shown to? (Completeness)								
* Q14 Does the repository interface retrieve all data about the advertiser-defined audience targeting? (Completeness)								

Appendix III: Breakdown by Evaluation Parameter

Special Criterion 6: Interface - Search Filters								
Evaluation parameters								
SC6 Does the social media platform repository interface allow you to filter data by search terms and advertisers of interest?								
* Q44 Is it possible to retrieve current ads and updated data for all ads using search terms in the repository interface? <i>(Accessibility)</i>								
* Q54 Is it possible to filter ad data in the repository interface by page or advertiser profile? <i>(Relevância)</i>								

Completeness

Special Criterion 1

▼

Q1

Does the API provide up-to-date data about ad content? (Special Criterion 1)

This item checks whether the social media platform's ad repository API provides relevant, up-to-date data about ad content, such as text and media URLs.

∞ Meta For political, electoral, and/or socially relevant ads, Meta's Ad Repository API provides relevant up-to-date data on textual content and URLs for media.	in LinkedIn The LinkedIn Ad Repository API does not provide any data regarding the content of the ad, only a URL to the page where it appears in the repository interface.	🎵 TikTok There is no repository for accessing and collecting data on TikTok ads in Brazil.
Telegram Each ad is produced using text (limited to 160 characters, with spaces) and a button with the URL for a Telegram channel and this information is provided by the platform's API.	Google The Google BigQuery API does not provide data regarding the content of the ads, whether in text, static image or video format, only a URL to the page on which it is displayed in the repository interface.	Kwai There is no repository for accessing and collecting data on Kwai ads in Brazil.
	X/Xwitter There is no repository for accessing and collecting data on X/Twitter ads in Brazil.	Pinterest There is no repository for accessing and collecting data about Pinterest ads in Brazil.

Completeness

Special Criterion 2

▼

Q2

Does the API return up-to-date demographic data about the audience the ad was shown to? (Special Criterion 2)

This item verifies whether the social media platform's Ad Repository API returns specific and up-to-date data about the age and gender of audiences reached for at least one year after the ad was last shown.

∞ Meta The Meta Ad Repository API only returns gender and age information for political, election, and/or socially relevant ads.	in LinkedIn The LinkedIn Ad Repository API does not return demographic data for the audience the ad was shown to in Brazil.	🎵 TikTok There is no repository for accessing and collecting data on TikTok ads in Brazil.
Telegram Telegram does not provide advertisers with the ability to micro-target their audience based on demographic criteria. Ads are distributed in public channels defined by the advertiser and can be seen by all of their subscribers.	Google The Google BigQuery API does not return demographic data about the audience ads were shown to.	Kwai There is no repository for accessing and collecting data on Kwai ads in Brazil.
	X/Xwitter There is no repository for accessing and collecting data on X/Twitter ads in Brazil.	Pinterest There is no repository for accessing and collecting data about Pinterest ads in Brazil.

Q3

Does the API provide up-to-date geographic data about the audience to which the ad was displayed? (Special Criterion 2)

This item checks whether the social media platform’s ad repository API provides up-to-date data on the geographic location of the audience reached for at least one year after the ad was last displayed. The Brazilian federative unit is the largest granularity accepted.

∞ Meta

For political, electoral and/or socially relevant ads, Meta’s ad repository API provides information on the geographic location of the audience reached, detailing the percentage of the audience impacted in each federative unit of Brazil.

Telegram

Telegram does not provide advertisers with the ability to target audiences based on geographic criteria. Ads are distributed in channels defined by the advertiser and can be seen by all subscribers to those channels.

in LinkedIn

The LinkedIn Ads Repository API does not provide data about the location of the audience to whom ads were shown in Brazil.

Google

The Google BigQuery API does not provide data about the location of the audience to whom ads were shown in Brazil..

X X/Twitter

There is no repository for accessing and collecting data on X/Twitter ads in Brazil.

🎵 TikTok

There is no repository for accessing and collecting data on TikTok ads in Brazil.

📺 Kwai

There is no repository for accessing and collecting data on Kwai ads in Brazil.

📌 Pinterest

There is no repository for accessing and collecting data about Pinterest ads in Brazil.

Q4

Does the API retrieve all data about the advertiser-defined audience targeting? (Special Criterion 2)

This item assesses whether the social media platform’s ad repository API retrieves up-to-date data for all audience targeting criteria defined by the advertiser when creating and publishing ads, such as prioritizing or excluding demographic and geographic segments and information about interests, attitudes, behaviors, and keywords.

∞ Meta

The Meta Ad Repository API does not retrieve data about advertiser-defined audience targeting for ads served in Brazil.

Telegram

Telegram does not provide advertisers with the ability to micro-target their audience. Ads are distributed in channels defined by the advertiser and can be seen by all subscribers to those channels.

in LinkedIn

The LinkedIn Ads Repository API does not retrieve data about advertiser-defined audience targeting for ads displayed in Brazil.

Google

It is not possible to retrieve current data on advertiser-defined audience targeting for ads displayed in Brazil through the Google BigQuery API, as this information is only available for political and electoral ads displayed in Brazil until the end of April 2024 (Google, 2024; [N.d.]b).

X X/Twitter

There is no repository for accessing and collecting data on X/Twitter ads in Brazil.

🎵 TikTok

There is no repository for accessing and collecting data on TikTok ads in Brazil.

📺 Kwai

There is no repository for accessing and collecting data on Kwai ads in Brazil.

📌 Pinterest

There is no repository for accessing and collecting data about Pinterest ads in Brazil.

Completeness

Q5

Does the API return updated data for inactive ads?

This item checks whether the social media platform’s ad repository API returns updated data for ads that have been inactive for up to one year, upon request.

∞ Meta The Meta Ad Repository API returns data for inactive political, election, and/or socially relevant ads, which are available in the public repository for seven years after the last ad served. Data for other ads is not archived.	in LinkedIn The LinkedIn Ads Library API returns data for any ads served, available for a period of one year after the last served date.	🎵 TikTok There is no repository for accessing and collecting data on TikTok ads in Brazil.
	📄 Google It is not possible to extract updated data from inactive ads through the Google BigQuery API, only from political and electoral ads broadcast in Brazil until the end of April 2024.	📺 Kwai There is no repository for accessing and collecting data on Kwai ads in Brazil.
Telegram Only active ads on already known and monitored Telegram channels can be collected at the time of the request via its API.		📌 Pinterest There is no repository for accessing and collecting data about Pinterest ads in Brazil.
	X/X/Twitter There is no repository for accessing and collecting data on X/Twitter ads in Brazil.	

Completeness

Q6

Does the API provide up-to-date data on advertisers who have served ads on the social media platform?

This item examines whether the social media platform’s Ad Repository API provides up-to-date and relevant data about advertisers who have served ads on the platform in at least the last year.

∞ Meta For political, electoral, and/or socially relevant ads, the Meta Ads Repository API makes data about the advertiser available, including their unique identifier and the name of their Facebook Page.	in LinkedIn For all ads served on the platform in the last year, the LinkedIn Ad Repository API provides the name and URL for the advertiser page on its platform.	🎵 TikTok There is no repository for accessing and collecting data on TikTok ads in Brazil.
	📄 Google It is not possible to retrieve current advertiser data through the Google BigQuery API, as this information is only available for political and electoral ads served in Brazil until the end of April 2024	📺 Kwai There is no repository for accessing and collecting data on Kwai ads in Brazil.
Telegram The Telegram API does not provide data on who promoted the ad.		📌 Pinterest There is no repository for accessing and collecting data about Pinterest ads in Brazil.
	X/X/Twitter There is no repository for accessing and collecting data on X/Twitter ads in Brazil.	

Completeness

Q7

Does the API provide up-to-date data on ad funders?

This item verifies that the social media platform's Ad Repository API provides up-to-date and relevant data on who paid for boosted ads served in at least the last year.

Meta

For political, electoral, and/or socially relevant ads, the Meta Ad Repository API provides the name of the ad funder.

LinkedIn

The LinkedIn Ad Repository API provides the name registered on the platform by the legal entity or individual responsible for paying for the ad.

TikTok

There is no repository for accessing and collecting data on TikTok ads in Brazil.

Telegram

The Telegram API does not provide data on ad funders.

Google

The Google BigQuery API does not provide data on ad funders.

Kwai

There is no repository for accessing and collecting data on Kwai ads in Brazil.

Pinterest

There is no repository for accessing and collecting data about Pinterest ads in Brazil.

X/Twitter

There is no repository for accessing and collecting data on X/Twitter ads in Brazil.

Completeness

Q8

Does the API provide up-to-date data on the ad boosting period?

This item checks whether the social media platform's Ad Repository API provides up-to-date and relevant data on the days on which boosted ads were served in the last year.

Meta

The Meta Ad Repository API provides start and end dates for political, electoral, and/or socially relevant ads.

LinkedIn

The LinkedIn Ads Repository API does not provide start and end dates for boosted ads to Brazilian users.

TikTok

There is no repository for accessing and collecting data on TikTok ads in Brazil.

Telegram

The Telegram API does not provide data on the period during which ads were boosted and they can only be retrieved if they are active on the platform.

Google

It is not possible to retrieve current data about the ad boosting period through the Google BigQuery API, as this information is only available for political and electoral ads served in Brazil until the end of April 2024.

Kwai

There is no repository for accessing and collecting data on Kwai ads in Brazil.

Pinterest

There is no repository for accessing and collecting data about Pinterest ads in Brazil.

X/Twitter

There is no repository for accessing and collecting data on X/Twitter ads in Brazil.

Completeness

Q9

Does the API retrieve up-to-date data about user engagement with the ad?

Note that for ads that allow interactions, the social media platform's ad repository API retrieves up-to-date data on total user interactions, such as likes, comments, shares, and clicks, for at least one year after the last time the ads were displayed.

-  **Meta**

The Meta Ad Repository API does not retrieve data about user engagement with ads served in Brazil.
-  **LinkedIn**

The LinkedIn Ads Repository API does not retrieve data about user engagement with ads served in Brazil.
-  **TikTok**

There is no repository for accessing and collecting data on TikTok ads in Brazil.
-  **Telegram**

The Telegram API does not retrieve data about user engagement with ads served in Brazil.
-  **Google**

The Google BigQuery API does not retrieve data about user engagement with ads served in Brazil.
-  **Kwai**

There is no repository for accessing and collecting data on Kwai ads in Brazil.
-  **Pinterest**

There is no repository for accessing and collecting data about Pinterest ads in Brazil.
-  **X/Twitter**

There is no repository for accessing and collecting data on X/Twitter ads in Brazil.

Completeness

Q10

Does the API allow the application of temporal filters to retrieve updated data?

This item assesses whether the social media platform's ad repository API provides a means to filter the retrieval of current ad data based on the ad's runtime.

-  **Meta**

Meta's ad repository API allows you to apply temporal filters for the start and end date of the ad, for retrieving data on political, electoral and/or socially relevant ads broadcast in Brazil.
-  **LinkedIn**

The LinkedIn Ads Repository API allows you to apply temporal filters for the start and end date of the ad, for retrieving data from all ads served in Brazil.
-  **TikTok**

There is no repository for accessing and collecting data on TikTok ads in Brazil.
-  **Kwai**

There is no repository for accessing and collecting data on Kwai ads in Brazil.
-  **Google**

It is not possible to retrieve current data using temporal filters through the Google BigQuery API, only political and electoral advertisements broadcast in Brazil until the end of April 2024.
-  **Telegram**

The Telegram API does not allow filtering the retrieval of ad data based on any criteria.
-  **Pinterest**

There is no repository for accessing and collecting data about Pinterest ads in Brazil.
-  **X/Twitter**

There is no repository for accessing and collecting data on X/Twitter ads in Brazil.

Completeness

▼

Q11

Does the API clearly and unambiguously signal whether ads were placed by verified or unverified advertisers?

This item evaluates whether the social media platform’s ad repository API clearly signals whether or not advertisers have been verified throughout the ad serving process.

∞ Meta Meta’s Ad Repository API does not return any data about advertiser verification. The only verification required for advertisers is for those who wish to run political, electoral, and/or socially relevant ads (Meta, [N.d.]g). However, advertisers can run ads of this type without categorizing them as such and therefore without going through a verification process. For other advertisers, Meta does not have any specific type of verification.	in LinkedIn The API does not signal advertisers’ verification status, and the platform’s documentation does not provide details on this process (LinkedIn, [N.d.]d). To promote ads on LinkedIn, simply register a user profile and provide a valid payment method.	🎵 TikTok There is no repository for accessing and collecting data on TikTok ads in Brazil.
	🔍 Google Google only archives ads served by verified advertisers in its advertising repository.	📺 Kwai There is no repository for accessing and collecting data on Kwai ads in Brazil.
📠 Telegram There is no indication of advertiser verification status in the data provided.	✂ X/Twitter There is no repository for accessing and collecting data on X/Twitter ads in Brazil.	📌 Pinterest There is no repository for accessing and collecting data about Pinterest ads in Brazil.

Completeness

Special Criterion 5

▼

Q12

Does the repository interface display up-to-date demographic data about the audience to which the ad was displayed? (Special Criterion 5)

This item verifies that the social media platform’s ad repository interface displays up-to-date data on the age and gender of audiences reached for at least one year after the ad was last displayed.

∞ Meta In the case of political, electoral and/or socially relevant ads, Meta’s ad repository interface displays demographic data about the audience to which the ad was shown in Brazil, organized into age and gender groups.	in LinkedIn The LinkedIn Ad Repository interface does not display demographic data for the audience the ad was shown to in Brazil.	🎵 TikTok There is no repository for accessing and collecting data on TikTok ads in Brazil.
	🔍 Google The Google Ads Repository interface does not display demographic data for the audience the ad was shown to in Brazil.	📺 Kwai There is no repository for accessing and collecting data on Kwai ads in Brazil.
📠 Telegram Telegram does not provide advertisers with the ability to micro-target their audience based on demographic criteria. Ads are distributed in channels defined by the advertiser and can be seen by all subscribers to those channels.	✂ X/Twitter There is no repository for accessing and collecting data on X/Twitter ads in Brazil.	📌 Pinterest There is no repository for accessing and collecting data about Pinterest ads in Brazil.

Completeness

Special Criterion 5

Q13

Does the repository interface display up-to-date geographic data about the audience the ad was shown to?
(Special Criterion 5)

This item verifies whether the social media platform's ad repository interface displays up-to-date data on the geographic location of the audience reached for at least one year after the last ad was displayed. The Brazilian federative unit is the largest granularity accepted.

Meta

For political, electoral and/or socially relevant ads, Meta's ad repository interface only displays information about the geographic location of the audience reached, detailing the percentage of the audience impacted in each federative unit of Brazil.

LinkedIn

The LinkedIn Ad Repository interface does not display geographic data for the audience the ad was shown to in Brazil.

TikTok

There is no repository for accessing and collecting data on TikTok ads in Brazil.

Google

The Google Ads Repository interface does not display geographic data for the audience to which the ad was shown in Brazil.

Telegram

Telegram does not provide advertisers with the ability to target audiences based on geographic criteria. Ads are distributed in channels defined by the advertiser and can be seen by all subscribers to those channels.

Kwai

There is no repository for accessing and collecting data on Kwai ads in Brazil.

Pinterest

There is no repository for accessing and collecting data about Pinterest ads in Brazil.

X/Twitter

There is no repository for accessing and collecting data on X/Twitter ads in Brazil.

Completeness

Special Criterion 5

Q14

Does the repository interface retrieve all data about the advertiser-defined audience segmentation?
(Special Criterion 5)

This item assesses whether the social media platform's ad repository interface retrieves data for all audience targeting criteria defined by the advertiser when creating and publishing ads, such as prioritizing or excluding demographic and geographic segments and information about interests, attitudes, behaviors, and keywords.

Meta

The Meta Ad Repository interface does not retrieve any data about the targeting set by the advertiser at the time of publication, for any ad type.

LinkedIn

The LinkedIn Ads Repository interface does not retrieve data about advertiser-defined audience targeting for ads displayed in Brazil.

TikTok

There is no repository for accessing and collecting data on TikTok ads in Brazil.

Google

It is not possible to retrieve current data on advertiser-defined audience targeting for ads served in Brazil through the Google Ads Repository interface, as this information is only available for political and electoral ads served in Brazil through the end of April 2024.

Telegram

Telegram does not provide advertisers with the ability to micro-target their audience. Ads are distributed in channels defined by the advertiser and can be seen by all subscribers to those channels.

Kwai

There is no repository for accessing and collecting data on Kwai ads in Brazil.

Pinterest

There is no repository for accessing and collecting data about Pinterest ads in Brazil.

X/Twitter

There is no repository for accessing and collecting data on X/Twitter ads in Brazil.

Completeness

Q15

Does the repository interface provide up-to-date data on inactive ads?

This item verifies that the social media platform’s ad repository interface allows you to find and view up-to-date data on inactive ads for up to one year after they stopped running.

∞ Meta Meta’s ad repository interface provides data on ads that are considered political, electoral, and/or socially relevant. Ads in other categories are only displayed while they are active.	in LinkedIn LinkedIn’s ad repository interface provides data on all ads served since June 2023 in Brazil and the information is available for up to one year after the last impression received on the platform.	🎵 TikTok There is no repository for accessing and collecting data on TikTok ads in Brazil.
Telegram Telegram does not offer a repository with an interface for accessing and collecting data on ads in Brazil.	Ⓜ Google The Google Ads Repository interface only provides up-to-date data on inactive ads powered by verified advertisers over the past year, which represents an unrepresentative and insufficient sample of ad data.	📺 Kwai There is no repository for accessing and collecting data on Kwai ads in Brazil.
	📌 Pinterest There is no repository for accessing and collecting data about Pinterest ads in Brazil.	
	✂ X/Twitter There is no repository for accessing and collecting data on X/Twitter ads in Brazil.	

Completeness

Q16

Does the repository interface return up-to-date data about advertisers who have published ads on the social media platform?

This item examines whether the social media platform’s ad repository interface returns up-to-date and relevant data about the advertisers responsible for boosting content.

∞ Meta Through the Meta Ad Repository interface, you can view advertiser information such as name, unique identifier, and number of followers.	in LinkedIn LinkedIn’s ad repository interface returns data such as the advertiser’s name and redirects to their page on the platform.	🎵 TikTok There is no repository for accessing and collecting data on TikTok ads in Brazil.
Telegram Telegram does not offer a repository with an interface for accessing and collecting data on ads in Brazil.	Ⓜ Google Google’s Ad Repository interface returns data such as the registered name and unique identifier of verified advertisers who have served ads in the past year, which represents an unrepresentative and insufficient sample of ad data.	📺 Kwai There is no repository for accessing and collecting data on Kwai ads in Brazil.
	📌 Pinterest There is no repository for accessing and collecting data about Pinterest ads in Brazil.	
	✂ X/Twitter There is no repository for accessing and collecting data on X/Twitter ads in Brazil.	

Completeness

Q17

Does the repository interface provide up-to-date data on ad funders?

This item checks whether the social media platform’s ad repository interface provides up-to-date and relevant data about who paid for the ad boost.

Meta Meta’s ad repository interface provides the names of funders of political, electoral, and/or socially relevant ads.	LinkedIn LinkedIn’s ad repository interface provides the names of funders for all ads running on the platform.	TikTok There is no repository for accessing and collecting data on TikTok ads in Brazil.
Telegram Telegram does not offer a repository with an interface for accessing and collecting data on ads in Brazil.	Google Google’s ad repository interface does not provide data about the funders of any type of ad.	Kwai There is no repository for accessing and collecting data on Kwai ads in Brazil.
	X/Twitter There is no repository for accessing and collecting data on X/Twitter ads in Brazil.	Pinterest There is no repository for accessing and collecting data about Pinterest ads in Brazil.

Completeness

Q18

Does the repository interface provide up-to-date data on the ad boosting period?

Here, we observe whether the social media platform’s ad repository interface provides up-to-date and relevant data on the days on which ads were boosted.

Meta Meta’s ad repository interface provides the start date and end date for ads categorized as political, electoral, and/or socially relevant. For the rest of the ads boosted in Brazil, only the start date is available.	LinkedIn LinkedIn’s ad repository interface does not provide start and end dates for boosted ads in Brazil.	TikTok There is no repository for accessing and collecting data on TikTok ads in Brazil.
	Google Currently, the Google Ads Repository interface only provides the end-of-serving date for ads driven by verified accounts.	Kwai There is no repository for accessing and collecting data on Kwai ads in Brazil.
Telegram Telegram does not offer a repository with an interface for accessing and collecting data on ads in Brazil.		Pinterest There is no repository for accessing and collecting data about Pinterest ads in Brazil.
	X/Twitter There is no repository for accessing and collecting data on X/Twitter ads in Brazil.	

Completeness

Q19

Does the repository interface retrieve up-to-date data about user engagement with the ad?

Here, we observe whether, in the case of ads that allow interactions, the social media platform's ad repository interface retrieves updated data regarding the total interactions performed by users, such as likes, comments, shares and clicks, for at least one year after their last display.

- Meta

Meta's ad repository interface does not retrieve data about user engagement with ads served in Brazil.
- LinkedIn

The LinkedIn Ads Repository interface does not retrieve data about user engagement with ads served in Brazil.
- TikTok

There is no repository for accessing and collecting data on TikTok ads in Brazil.
- Telegram

Telegram does not offer a repository with an interface for accessing and collecting data on ads in Brazil.
- Kwai

There is no repository for accessing and collecting data on Kwai ads in Brazil.
- Google

The Google Ads Repository interface does not retrieve data about user engagement with ads served in Brazil.
- Pinterest

There is no repository for accessing and collecting data about Pinterest ads in Brazil.
- X/Twitter

There is no repository for accessing and collecting data on X/Twitter ads in Brazil.

Completeness

Q20

Does the repository interface allow the application of temporal filters to retrieve updated data?

This item assesses whether the social media platform's ad repository interface provides a means to filter the retrieval of updated ad data based on the ad's runtime.

- Meta

Meta's ad repository interface allows you to filter available ads by impressions received within a given time period.
- LinkedIn

LinkedIn's ad repository interface allows you to filter available ads by their runtime.
- TikTok

There is no repository for accessing and collecting data on TikTok ads in Brazil.
- Kwai

There is no repository for accessing and collecting data on Kwai ads in Brazil.
- Google

Google's Ad Repository interface allows date filters to be applied only to inactive ads driven by verified advertisers within the last year, which represents an unrepresentative and insufficient sample of ad data.
- Pinterest

There is no repository for accessing and collecting data about Pinterest ads in Brazil.
- Telegram

Telegram does not offer a repository with an interface for accessing and collecting data on ads in Brazil..
- X/Twitter

There is no repository for accessing and collecting data on X/Twitter ads in Brazil.

Completeness



Q21

Does the repository interface clearly and unambiguously signal whether ads were placed by verified or unverified advertisers?

This item assesses whether the social media platform’s ad repository interface clearly signals whether or not advertisers have been verified throughout the ad serving process.

Meta

Meta requires advertisers to undergo a verification process before running political, electoral and/or socially relevant ads, sending additional information and documents to the platform (Meta, [N.d.]g). However, advertisers can promote ads of this type without categorizing them as such and, therefore, without undergoing verification processes. For other advertisers, Meta does not have any type of specific verification.

Telegram

Telegram does not offer a repository with an interface for accessing and collecting data on ads in Brazil.

LinkedIn

The repository interface does not flag advertisers’ verification status, and the platform’s documentation does not provide details on this process (LinkedIn, [N.d.]d). To promote ads on LinkedIn, advertisers may simply register a user profile and provide a valid payment method.

Google

Google only archives ads served by verified advertisers in its advertising repository.

X/Twitter

There is no repository for accessing and collecting data on X/Twitter ads in Brazil.

TikTok

There is no repository for accessing and collecting data on TikTok ads in Brazil.

Kwai

There is no repository for accessing and collecting data on Kwai ads in Brazil.

Pinterest

There is no repository for accessing and collecting data about Pinterest ads in Brazil.

Compliance



Q22

Is the data acquisition process and the structure in which it is made available by the API stable?

This item assesses if the structure of the databases made available changes frequently or without prior notice, which might affect applications that integrate with the social network platform’s ad repository API.

Meta

The Meta Ad Repository API documents changes between different versions (Meta, [N.d.]a) and provides time for necessary changes to be made before the previous version is deprecated.

Telegram

Although the platform API is in beta, the formats of the data delivered remain stable.

LinkedIn

The structure of the advertising databases made available by LinkedIn is stable, as the updated versions of its advertising repository API are traditionally released in time for adaptations.

Google

Google BigQuery’s API is not stable enough for systematic data acquisition due to sudden changes in the platform’s policies and transparency measures. In Brazil, the platform declared that it would prohibit the display of political-electoral ads, and consequently suspended the update of its repository, with only one week’s notice and without offering other means for collecting ad data.

X/Twitter

There is no repository for accessing and collecting data on X/Twitter ads in Brazil.

TikTok

There is no repository for accessing and collecting data on TikTok ads in Brazil.

Kwai

There is no repository for accessing and collecting data on Kwai ads in Brazil.

Pinterest

There is no repository for accessing and collecting data about Pinterest ads in Brazil.

Compliance

Q23

Does the API clearly and unequivocally signal content produced by Artificial Intelligence?

This item checks whether the social media platform's ad repository API flags ads where the use of Artificial Intelligence was instrumental in the production of their content.

∞ Meta Meta's Ad Repository API does not flag the use of Artificial Intelligence in the production of ad content (Meta, [N.d.]a).	in LinkedIn The LinkedIn Ad Repository API does not flag the use of Artificial Intelligence in the production of ad content.	🎵 TikTok There is no repository for accessing and collecting data on TikTok ads in Brazil.
Telegram The Telegram API does not flag the use of Artificial Intelligence in the production of ad content.	Google The Google BigQuery API does not flag the use of Artificial Intelligence in the production of ad content.	Kwai There is no repository for accessing and collecting data on Kwai ads in Brazil.
	X/Xwitter There is no repository for accessing and collecting data on X/Twitter ads in Brazil.	Pinterest There is no repository for accessing and collecting data about Pinterest ads in Brazil.

Compliance

Q24

Does the API return data in a standardized format?

This item checks whether the data returned by the social media platform's ad repository API is structured in a way that facilitates data storage and use, and is made available in formats that correspond to the technical consensus and/or standardization in the area, such as dates in accordance with the ISO8601 standard.

∞ Meta The Meta Ad Repository API returns dates in standard format, although the time information is not precise.	in LinkedIn The LinkedIn Ads Repository API returns dates in standard format, with day, month, and year information.	🎵 TikTok There is no repository for accessing and collecting data on TikTok ads in Brazil.
Telegram The data returned by the Telegram API is delivered in a standardized format.	Google The Google BigQuery API returns dates in standard format, with day, month, and year information.	Kwai There is no repository for accessing and collecting data on Kwai ads in Brazil.
	X/Xwitter There is no repository for accessing and collecting data on X/Twitter ads in Brazil.	Pinterest There is no repository for accessing and collecting data about Pinterest ads in Brazil.

Q25

Does the repository interface clearly and unequivocally signal content produced by Artificial Intelligence?

This criterion checks whether the social media platform’s ad repository interface flags ads in which the use of Artificial Intelligence was instrumental in the production of their content.

∞ Meta

Meta’s ad repository interface does not flag the use of Artificial Intelligence in the production of ad content.

in LinkedIn

LinkedIn’s ad repository interface does not flag the use of Artificial Intelligence in the production of ad content.

🎵 TikTok

There is no repository for accessing and collecting data on TikTok ads in Brazil.

Telegram

Telegram does not offer a repository with an interface for accessing and collecting data on ads in Brazil.

Google

Google’s ad repository interface does not flag the use of Artificial Intelligence in the production of ad content.

Kwai

There is no repository for accessing and collecting data on Kwai ads in Brazil.

Pinterest

There is no repository for accessing and collecting data about Pinterest ads in Brazil.

X X/Twitter

There is no repository for accessing and collecting data on X/Twitter ads in Brazil.

Q26

Is the API documentation published and available in open access?

This item checks whether the social media platform publishes adequate and sufficient documentation on the internet for the best use of its API, with unrestricted access and without the need for registration and login.

∞ Meta

Meta’s Ad Repository API documentation is available without requiring authentication (Meta, [N.d.]d; [N.d.]a).

in LinkedIn

LinkedIn Ads Repository API documentation is available without requiring authentication (LinkedIn, [N.d.]g).

🎵 TikTok

There is no repository for accessing and collecting data on TikTok ads in Brazil.

Telegram

Documentation is publicly available: there is a page with guidelines and methods that apps should follow to handle sponsored messages on Telegram (Telegram, [N.d.]d). There are also specific pages with methods of retrieving and interacting with ads (Telegram, [N.d.]b).

Google

The Google BigQuery API (Google, [N.d.]a) and Google Political Ads dataset (Google, [N.d.]f) documentation can be accessed by any user, without the need for authentication

Kwai

There is no repository for accessing and collecting data on Kwai ads in Brazil.

Pinterest

There is no repository for accessing and collecting data about Pinterest ads in Brazil.

X X/Twitter

There is no repository for accessing and collecting data on X/Twitter ads in Brazil.

Compliance

Q27

Is the provided API documentation written clearly and exemplified?

This item checks whether the social media platform's ad repository API documentation is written clearly, completely, and with specific examples that simulate real-world usage situations, making it easier for users with no prior experience to understand.

- Meta

Meta's Ad Repository API documentation does not include detailed examples of its usage; we found only two examples of simple requests in the documentation (Meta, [N.d.]d; [N.d.]a).

LinkedIn

LinkedIn's Ad Repository API documentation lacks more robust request examples and specific use cases (LinkedIn, [N.d.]c).

TikTok

There is no repository for accessing and collecting data on TikTok ads in Brazil.

Kwai

There is no repository for accessing and collecting data on Kwai ads in Brazil.

Pinterest

There is no repository for accessing and collecting data about Pinterest ads in Brazil.

Telegram

The method of retrieving ad data is not clearly documented or exemplified by the platform's official API documentation.

Google

Google BigQuery documentation is not clear and navigation is complicated for users who are not familiar with it, since the examples and usage scenarios vary greatly depending on the data to be collected

X/Twitter

There is no repository for accessing and collecting data on X/Twitter ads in Brazil.

Compliance

Q28

Does the documentation clearly describe what the terms of use of the API are?

This item checks if the social media platform's ad repository API documentation present its terms of use clearly and unambiguously, both in accordance with their own rules and with regard to the law.

Meta

The platform provides documentation with terms of use for developers and guidelines on the use of the various Meta APIs, referenced on the Ad Repository API page (Meta, [N.d.]a).

LinkedIn

The LinkedIn Ad Repository API Terms of Use describe the rules, permissions, and prohibitions that advertisers must adhere to when using the service (LinkedIn, [N.d.]e).

TikTok

There is no repository for accessing and collecting data on TikTok ads in Brazil.

Kwai

There is no repository for accessing and collecting data on Kwai ads in Brazil.

Pinterest

There is no repository for accessing and collecting data about Pinterest ads in Brazil.

Telegram

The terms of use of the platform API can be found on the main page of the API documentation (Telegram, [N.d.]h).

Google

The terms of use and service of the Google BigQuery API are not immediately available in its official documentation. In the case of the documentation for advertising datasets, Google only states that there are no restrictions on the use of the data provided.

X/Twitter

There is no repository for accessing and collecting data on X/Twitter ads in Brazil.

104

105

Compliance

Q29

Is the API documentation available natively in Portuguese?

This criterion verifies that the social media platform’s ad repository API documentation is available in Portuguese, in an easy-to-find and accessible location.

Meta Some parts of the Meta Ad Repository API documentation are not translated into Portuguese, including texts and descriptions of parameters and responses (Meta, [N.d.]d).	LinkedIn The LinkedIn Ads Repository API terms of use, guidance on available features, and examples are provided in Portuguese (LinkedIn, [N.d.]c).	TikTok There is no repository for accessing and collecting data on TikTok ads in Brazil.
Telegram Telegram API documentation is not officially available in Portuguese.	Google Not all sections of the Google BigQuery API documentation are available in Portuguese. Additionally, the ad database documentation is only published in English.	Kwai There is no repository for accessing and collecting data on Kwai ads in Brazil.
	X/Twitter There is no repository for accessing and collecting data on X/Twitter ads in Brazil.	Pinterest There is no repository for accessing and collecting data about Pinterest ads in Brazil.

Compliance

Q30

Does the social media platform produce and make detailed transparency reports publicly available, without the need for request and with data on its proactive manual and/or computational moderation activity, so as to prevent illegal, irregular or abusive advertising?

This item verifies whether the social media platform makes transparency reports publicly available without the need for a request, at least every six months, detailing information of public interest about its operations in Brazil with regard to the marketing and placement of advertisements, including data on proactive manual and/or computational moderation activities (without the need for a court order or extrajudicial request).

Meta Meta does not produce transparency reports detailing its ad moderation activity in Brazil.	LinkedIn LinkedIn does not produce transparency reports detailing its ad moderation activity in Brazil.	TikTok TikTok does not produce transparency reports detailing its ad moderation activity in Brazil. However, the company reports the total number of ads removed globally, without specifying the location or reason (TikTok, [N.d.]d).
Telegram Telegram does not produce transparency reports detailing its ad moderation activity in Brazil.	Google Google does not produce transparency reports detailing its ad moderation activity in Brazil.	Kwai Kwai does not produce transparency reports detailing its ad moderation activity in Brazil.
	X/Twitter X/Twitter does not produce transparency reports detailing its ad moderation activity in Brazil.	Pinterest Pinterest does not produce transparency reports detailing its ad moderation activity in Brazil.

Compliance

Q31

Are data from transparency reports on ad moderation actions on the social media platform broken down by geographic location?

This item verifies whether transparency report data on the social media platform's ad moderation activity is grouped by specific regions. The Brazilian federative unit is the largest granularity accepted.

Meta

Meta does not produce transparency reports detailing its ad moderation activity in Brazil.

LinkedIn

LinkedIn does not produce transparency reports detailing its ad moderation activity in Brazil.

TikTok

TikTok does not produce transparency reports detailing its ad moderation activity in Brazil. However, the company reports the total number of ads removed globally, without specifying the location or reason (TikTok, [N.d.]d).

Telegram

Telegram does not produce transparency reports detailing its ad moderation activity in Brazil.

Google

Google does not produce transparency reports detailing its ad moderation activity in Brazil.

X/Twitter

X/Twitter does not produce transparency reports detailing its ad moderation activity in Brazil.

Kwai

Kwai does not produce transparency reports detailing its ad moderation activity in Brazil.

Pinterest

Pinterest does not produce transparency reports detailing its ad moderation activity in Brazil.

Compliance

Q32

Are data from transparency reports on social media platform ad moderation activity broken down by the type(s) of violation that led to the removal?

This item verifies that transparency report data on the social media platform's ad moderation activity is grouped by type of violation identified.

Meta

Meta does not produce transparency reports detailing its ad moderation activity in Brazil.

LinkedIn

LinkedIn does not produce transparency reports detailing its ad moderation activity in Brazil.

TikTok

TikTok does not produce transparency reports detailing its ad moderation activity in Brazil. However, the company reports the total number of ads removed globally, without specifying the location or reason (TikTok, [N.d.]d).

Telegram

Telegram does not produce transparency reports detailing its ad moderation activity in Brazil.

Google

Google does not produce transparency reports detailing its ad moderation activity in Brazil.

X/Twitter

X/Twitter does not produce transparency reports detailing its ad moderation activity in Brazil.

Kwai

Kwai does not produce transparency reports detailing its ad moderation activity in Brazil.

Pinterest

Pinterest does not produce transparency reports detailing its ad moderation activity in Brazil.

Compliance

Do transparency reports on ad moderation specify and present information on requests made by government entities to the social media platform?

Q33

This item checks whether the social media platform's transparency reports list the requests made by Brazilian government entities, detailing the nature of the requests, the total number of requests, the volume of requests granted and denied, the government entity that made the request and whether the request was made through judicial or extrajudicial means.

 **Meta**

Meta does not produce transparency reports detailing its ad moderation activity in Brazil.

 **LinkedIn**

LinkedIn does not produce transparency reports detailing its ad moderation activity in Brazil.

 **TikTok**

TikTok does not produce transparency reports detailing its ad moderation activity in Brazil. However, the company reports the total number of ads removed globally, without specifying the location or reason (TikTok, [N.d.]d).

 **Telegram**

Telegram does not produce transparency reports detailing its ad moderation activity in Brazil.

 **Google**

Google does not produce transparency reports detailing its ad moderation activity in Brazil.

 **Kwai**

Kwai does not produce transparency reports detailing its ad moderation activity in Brazil.

 **X/Twitter**

X/Twitter does not produce transparency reports detailing its ad moderation activity in Brazil.

 **Pinterest**

Pinterest does not produce transparency reports detailing its ad moderation activity in Brazil.

Accessibility

Special Criterion 1

Does the social media platform provide an API to access and collect updated data on all types of published ads? (Special Criterion 1)

Q34

This item checks whether the social media platform offers an API in Brazil with at least one endpoint for accessing and collecting updated data on posts promoted in the last year.

 **Meta**

Meta makes data available on ads which are classified as political, electoral and/or socially relevant, published up to seven years prior to the request through its ad repository API (Meta, [N.d.] a). Data on other types of ads cannot be collected in the same way, unless they have circulated in the European Union as well as in Brazil.

 **LinkedIn**

LinkedIn offers access to the "Vetted API Program" on its Marketing Developer Platform for access to the API of its ad repository, with free access for users who request developer registration on the platform (LinkedIn, [N.d.]b).

 **X/Twitter**

There is no repository for accessing and collecting data on X/Twitter ads in Brazil.

 **TikTok**

There is no repository for accessing and collecting data on TikTok ads in Brazil.

 **Google**

The Google BigQuery API – Google's corporate data management, query, collection and analysis service (Ayodele; Weiss, 2023; Google, [N.d.] j) – only allows for the collection of data from political and electoral ads published on Google platforms in Brazil until the end of April 2024 (Google, 2024; [N.d.] b). Commercial ads are still permitted, but cannot be collected via the API. Although the API no longer provides updated data on any ads, we consider its functionalities when evaluating technical criteria.

 **Telegram**

Telegram provides a specific endpoint for collecting ads in the same API that provides user-generated content data. It is only possible to retrieve data from ads served on channels already known to, and monitored by, the person making the request.

 **Kwai**

There is no repository for accessing and collecting data on Kwai ads in Brazil.

 **Pinterest**

There is no repository for accessing and collecting data about Pinterest ads in Brazil.

Accessibility

Q35

Is API access free?
We checked whether any payment is required to use the social media platform's ad repository API or whether there is an exemption, at least for researchers.

∞ Meta Anyone with a developer account has free access to the Meta Ad Repository API.	in LinkedIn Any LinkedIn user account can create a developer account and from there build applications to access the API of their ad repository.	🎵 TikTok There is no repository for accessing and collecting data on TikTok ads in Brazil.
Telegram Although Telegram does not provide a specific API for ads that circulate in Brazil, ads displayed in groups and channels previously monitored by those making the request can be collected through the standard API (used to collect content produced by users), which is free.	Google Collecting ads served on Google platforms is free but there are limitations. All users of the service have free access to up to 1 TB per month, via Google BigQuery (Google, [N.d.]). When this data access quota runs out, user access is suspended until the following month, or a larger quota can be purchased for US\$6.25 for every 1 terabyte of requests (Google, [N.d.]).	Kwai There is no repository for accessing and collecting data on Kwai ads in Brazil.
	X/Twitter There is no repository for accessing and collecting data on X/Twitter ads in Brazil.	Pinterest There is no repository for accessing and collecting data about Pinterest ads in Brazil.

Accessibility

Q36

Can tokens for API access be created free of charge?
Here we check if more than one API token from the social network platform's ad repository can be used from the same developer account, free of charge.

∞ Meta Anyone with a Meta developer account can build applications to generate API access tokens for free.	in LinkedIn Anyone with a LinkedIn developer account can build applications to generate API access tokens for free.	🎵 TikTok There is no repository for accessing and collecting data on TikTok ads in Brazil.
Telegram An account can be created to access the Telegram API with an access token, free of charge.	Google There is no charge for creating new authentication tokens for the Google BigQuery API.	Kwai There is no repository for accessing and collecting data on Kwai ads in Brazil.
	X/Twitter There is no repository for accessing and collecting data on X/Twitter ads in Brazil.	Pinterest There is no repository for accessing and collecting data about Pinterest ads in Brazil.

Accessibility

Q37

Can new tokens be created to access to the API without a limit on the amount?

This item checks whether the platform limits the amount of tokens per user/ account for accessing the social media platform’s ad repository API.

∞ Meta It is possible to create multiple tokens associated with an application.	in LinkedIn The platform does not determine a maximum number of tokens, but imposes substantial limits on requests per 24-hour cycle, with 500 queries per user and 1,000 queries per application (Microsoft, 2023a). Therefore, for more robust collections, it is necessary to use different accounts and create different applications.	🎵 TikTok There is no repository for accessing and collecting data on TikTok ads in Brazil.
📠 Telegram Only one account is allowed per phone number (Telegram, [N.d.]c), which means multiple phone numbers must be used to generate new access tokens.		📺 Kwai There is no repository for accessing and collecting data on Kwai ads in Brazil.
	🔍 Google Google BigQuery API tokens are used for authentication and there is no limitation on data collection (Google, [N.d.]h). In addition, they are constantly and automatically renewed in an appropriate manner to run applications from external developers.	📌 Pinterest There is no repository for accessing and collecting data about Pinterest ads in Brazil.
	✖ X/Twitter There is no repository for accessing and collecting data on X/Twitter ads in Brazil.	

Accessibility

Q38

Does the API provide a form of authentication that allows for simplified automatic renewal of access tokens, without any blocking of data acquisition?

This item checks whether tokens made available for use of the social media platform’s ad repository API do not expire or whether renewal can be done automatically.

∞ Meta By default, tokens expire in about two hours and are not renewable (Meta, [N.d.]e; [N.d.]h). While it is possible to extend the token validity through a specific endpoint (Meta, [N.d.]h) or the Graph API developer interface(Meta, [N.d.]c), tokens expire after 60 days and there is no easy way to renew them.	in LinkedIn LinkedIn refreshes tokens for all approved partners on the Marketing Developer Platform – which includes the LinkedIn Ads Repository API. Tokens can be refreshed every 60 days (Microsoft, 2023b).	🎵 TikTok There is no repository for accessing and collecting data on TikTok ads in Brazil.
		📺 Kwai There is no repository for accessing and collecting data on Kwai ads in Brazil.
	🔍 Google Google BigQuery tokens are valid for 1 hour and are automatically renewed by the platform, without affecting applications running on its API (Google, [N.d.]h).	📌 Pinterest There is no repository for accessing and collecting data about Pinterest ads in Brazil.
📠 Telegram Although the Telegram API refreshes tokens automatically (Telegram, [N.d.]i), the account used in our tests was repeatedly blocked, without any reason given by the platform Furthermore, the platform’s customer service did not respond to requests for clarification sent via email.	✖ X/Twitter There is no repository for accessing and collecting data on X/Twitter ads in Brazil.	

Accessibility

▼

Q39

Is it possible to extract data directly from the API response?

This item checks whether content and authorship data is returned directly in the social media platform's ad repository API response, and whether it can be extracted without needing to redirect to other windows.

∞ Meta The expected ad data is delivered directly in the Meta Ad Repository API response. ✓	in LinkedIn The LinkedIn Ads Repository API does not return the expected data directly in its responses, since information about ad content can only be accessed from a redirect URL. ✗	🎵 TikTok There is no repository for accessing and collecting data on TikTok ads in Brazil. ✗
Telegram The expected data about ads can be downloaded directly from the API response (Telegram, [N.d.]g). ✓	Google The Google BigQuery API does not return all the expected data about ads in its responses, since information about ad content can only be accessed from a redirect URL. ✗	Kwai There is no repository for accessing and collecting data on Kwai ads in Brazil. ✗
	X/Twitter There is no repository for accessing and collecting data on X/Twitter ads in Brazil. ✗	Pinterest There is no repository for accessing and collecting data about Pinterest ads in Brazil. ✗

Accessibility

Special Criterion 3

▼

Q40

Does the API provide a means to retrieve ads from search terms? (Special Criterion 3)

This item identifies whether updated ad data can be retrieved from user-customized search terms via the social media platform's ad repository API.

∞ Meta Meta's Ad Repository API only allows searches for terms in the content of political, electoral and/or socially relevant ads. Based on the tests performed and in NetLab's experience, it is possible to search for terms in the text, image or video of the ad. ⌚	in LinkedIn The LinkedIn Ads Repository API allows you to search for ads based on specific keywords found in their text or in the advertiser name. ✓	🎵 TikTok There is no repository for accessing and collecting data on TikTok ads in Brazil. ✗
	Google The Google BigQuery API does not support retrieving ads using search terms. ✗	Kwai There is no repository for accessing and collecting data on Kwai ads in Brazil. ✗
Telegram The Telegram API does not support retrieving ads via search terms. ✗		Pinterest There is no repository for accessing and collecting data about Pinterest ads in Brazil. ✗
	X/Twitter There is no repository for accessing and collecting data on X/Twitter ads in Brazil. ✗	

Q41

Does the API provide a means to retrieve updated data for a specific ad?

This item checks whether up-to-date data can be retrieved for ads served within the last year or more from their unique identifiers, via the social media platform's Ad Repository API.

∞ Meta

There is no endpoint or filters to retrieve specific ad data via the Meta Ad Repository API.

Telegram

There is no endpoint or filters to retrieve specific ad data via the Telegram API.

in LinkedIn

There is no endpoint or filters to retrieve specific ad data via the LinkedIn Ads Repository API.

Google

It is not possible to retrieve updated ad data using unique identifiers through the Google BigQuery API, only for political and electoral ads served in Brazil up to the end of April 2024.

X X/Twitter

There is no repository for accessing and collecting data on X/Twitter ads in Brazil.

🎵 TikTok

There is no repository for accessing and collecting data on TikTok ads in Brazil.

Kwai

There is no repository for accessing and collecting data on Kwai ads in Brazil.

Pinterest

There is no repository for accessing and collecting data about Pinterest ads in Brazil.

Q42

Does the social media platform provide an ad repository interface to access up-to-date data on all types of published ads? (Special Criterion 4)

This item checks whether the social media platform provides an interface for accessing updated data on boosted publications. This facilitates research using ads, without researchers needing programming knowledge.

∞ Meta

Meta's ad repository interface provides data on all types of active ads running on the company's platforms, although there are considerable differences in the information provided for political, electoral and/or socially relevant ads (Meta, [N.d.]a).

Telegram

Telegram does not offer a repository with an interface for accessing and collecting data on ads in Brazil.

in LinkedIn

LinkedIn provides an interface for accessing the ad repository, which displays all ads broadcast in Brazil in the last year (LinkedIn, [N.d.]a).

Google

The Google Ads repository interface in Brazil can only be searched for ad content which was driven by verified advertisers in the last year, or political and electoral ads broadcast up until the end of April 2024 (Google, [N.d.]e). Since the volume of ads driven by unverified advertisers is unknown, the repository provides only a non-representative and insufficient sample of the ads driven on the company's platforms.

X X/Twitter

There is no repository for accessing and collecting data on X/Twitter ads in Brazil.

🎵 TikTok

There is no repository for accessing and collecting data on TikTok ads in Brazil.

Kwai

There is no repository for accessing and collecting data on Kwai ads in Brazil.

Pinterest

There is no repository for accessing and collecting data about Pinterest ads in Brazil.

Accessibility

Special Criterion 4

▼

Q43

Is it possible to extract the data displayed in the repository interface? (Special Criterion 4)

This item checks whether updated data displayed in the social network platform's ad repository interface can be extracted for use in other applications using files in widely used formats.

∞ Meta

In the case of political, electoral and/or socially relevant ads, it is possible to extract the data displayed in the Meta ad repository interface in a structured format.

in LinkedIn

The LinkedIn Ads Repository interface does not allow you to export data in any format.

🎵 TikTok

There is no repository for accessing and collecting data on TikTok ads in Brazil.

Telegram

Telegram does not offer a repository with an interface for accessing and collecting data on ads in Brazil.

🔍 Google

It is not possible to extract current ad data in a structured format through the Google Ads Repository interface, only political and electoral ads run in Brazil up to the end of April 2024.

📺 Kwai

There is no repository for accessing and collecting data on Kwai ads in Brazil.

📌 Pinterest

There is no repository for accessing and collecting data about Pinterest ads in Brazil.

✂ X/Twitter

There is no repository for accessing and collecting data on X/Twitter ads in Brazil.

Accessibility

Special Criterion 6

▼

Q44

Is it possible to retrieve current advertisements and updated data for all advertisements using search terms from the repository interface? (Special Criterion 6)

This item whether updated ad data can be retrieved via the social media platform's ad repository interface and via user-customizable search terms.

∞ Meta

Search terms can be specified in the search tool in the Meta Ad Repository interface. According to our testing, the term can be present in the text, image or video of the ad.

in LinkedIn

The LinkedIn Ad Repository interface allows you to search for keywords in both the ad body text field and the advertiser name field.

🎵 TikTok

There is no repository for accessing and collecting data on TikTok ads in Brazil.

Telegram

Telegram does not offer a repository with an interface for accessing and collecting data on ads in Brazil.

🔍 Google

Google's ad repository interface does not allow you to retrieve data for any type of ad via search terms.

📺 Kwai

There is no repository for accessing and collecting data on Kwai ads in Brazil.

📌 Pinterest

There is no repository for accessing and collecting data about Pinterest ads in Brazil.

✂ X/Twitter

There is no repository for accessing and collecting data on X/Twitter ads in Brazil.

Consistency



Q45

Does the API indicate when an ad has been removed for violating the social media platform’s terms?

We check whether the social media platform’s ad repository API indicates if an ad has been removed, whether the reason is given and the date of removal.

 Meta

The Meta Ad Repository API flags the removal of ads classified as political, electoral, and/or socially relevant in the retrieved data.



 LinkedIn

The LinkedIn Ads Repository API flags the removal of ads in the retrieved data.



 TikTok

There is no repository for accessing and collecting data on TikTok ads in Brazil.



 Telegram

Only ads that are active for Telegram users at the time of the request are available for collection via API, so there are no flags indicating content removal.



 Google

The Google BigQuery API does not report the removal of ads in the retrieved data, although data for these ads is returned.



 Kwai

There is no repository for accessing and collecting data on Kwai ads in Brazil.



 Pinterest

There is no repository for accessing and collecting data about Pinterest ads in Brazil.



 X/Twitter

There is no repository for accessing and collecting data on X/Twitter ads in Brazil.



Consistency



Q46

Does the API return persistent data?

This item checks whether data returned by the social media platform’s Ad Repository API expires, especially URLs.

 Meta

Some ad URLs expire for no explicit reason, even if they are political, electoral and/or socially relevant ads.



 LinkedIn

Data returned by the LinkedIn Ad Repository API has been shown to be persistent after multiple tests of retrieving the same ads.



 TikTok

There is no repository for accessing and collecting data on TikTok ads in Brazil.



 Telegram

The data returned by the API proved to be persistent after multiple tests retrieving the same ads.



 Google

Data returned by the Google BigQuery API has been shown to be persistent after multiple tests of retrieving the same ads. URLs to access ads in the Google Ads repository interface do not expire, although ads become unavailable for querying if they are removed for violating the platform’s terms of use.



 Kwai

There is no repository for accessing and collecting data on Kwai ads in Brazil.



 X/Twitter

There is no repository for accessing and collecting data on X/Twitter ads in Brazil.



 Pinterest

There is no repository for accessing and collecting data about Pinterest ads in Brazil.



Consistency



Q47

Does the API return consistent responses?

This item verifies that the data returned through the social media platform's Ad Repository API is always the same, or nearly the same, when the search terms, parameters, and filters of a request are maintained.

Meta

The data returned by the Meta Ad Repository API was consistent across all tests run.

LinkedIn

The data returned by the LinkedIn Ads Repository API was consistent across all tests run.

TikTok

There is no repository for accessing and collecting data on TikTok ads in Brazil.

Telegram

The data returned by the Telegram API was consistent across all tests performed.

Google

The data returned by the Google BigQuery API was consistent across all tests run.

Kwai

There is no repository for accessing and collecting data on Kwai ads in Brazil.

X/Twitter

There is no repository for accessing and collecting data on X/Twitter ads in Brazil.

Pinterest

There is no repository for accessing and collecting data about Pinterest ads in Brazil.

Consistency



Q48

Does the API return responses consistent with the parameters and filters used in the request?

This criterion checks whether the data returned by the social media platform's ad repository API actually matches the terms, parameters, and filters used in the request, making it possible to evaluate whether the data corresponds based on the data delivered.

Meta

The documentation is unclear about which fields of the ad the terms are searched for—in the text of the ad, in the photo, in the video, or in the advertiser's name, for example. Since Meta's ad repository API also does not indicate in which component of the ad the term was found, there is no way to assess whether the filters and parameters indicated in the request were applied consistently and appropriately.

Telegram

The platform API does not offer the ability to filter advertising data.

LinkedIn

Although the LinkedIn Ads Repository API allows date filters for retrieving data, it does not return any data about the period in which ads were circulated, thereby preventing any assessment of how consistently and appropriately the filters and parameters indicated in the request are applied.

Google

The data returned by the Google BigQuery API was consistent across all tests performed, confirming that the filters and parameters indicated during the request are consistently and correctly applied.

X/Twitter

There is no repository for accessing and collecting data on X/Twitter ads in Brazil.

TikTok

There is no repository for accessing and collecting data on TikTok ads in Brazil.

Kwai

There is no repository for accessing and collecting data on Kwai ads in Brazil.

Pinterest

There is no repository for accessing and collecting data about Pinterest ads in Brazil.



Q49

Does the repository interface signal when an ad has been removed for violating the social media platform’s terms?

Here we checked whether the repository interface in Brazil provides updated data on ads deleted by the social media platform and whether they are flagged as removed.

∞ Meta

Meta’s ad repository interface only flags and allows filtering for ads classified as political, electoral, and/or socially relevant that are removed for violating the company’s advertising standards.

Telegram

Telegram does not offer a repository with an interface for accessing and collecting data on ads in Brazil.

in LinkedIn

LinkedIn’s ad repository interface makes removed ads available for up to one year after their last impression and flags them with a specific label.

Google

It is not possible to access current data on ad removals, as this information is only available for political and electoral ads circulated in Brazil until the end of April 2024. Currently, when ads are removed, all information about the ad and its circulation is unavailable.

X X/Twitter

There is no repository for accessing and collecting data on X/Twitter ads in Brazil.

🎵 TikTok

There is no repository for accessing and collecting data on TikTok ads in Brazil.

📺 Kwai

There is no repository for accessing and collecting data on Kwai ads in Brazil.

📌 Pinterest

There is no repository for accessing and collecting data about Pinterest ads in Brazil.



Q50

Does the API retrieve the same data displayed in the repository interface?

This item checks whether the social media platform’s ad repository API has mismatches or differences in relation to what is displayed in the ad repository interface, in order to verify that all data displayed in the interface can be updated and collectible via API.

∞ Meta

In the Meta ad repository interface, you can access information such as the advertiser name, unique identifier, and content of all ads that can be retrieved at a given time. The API, on the other hand, only provides access to data for ads categorized as sensitive, political, and electoral. In addition, there is more information about the advertiser in the interface than in the API, such as the date the page was created, the number of followers, and, for political, electoral, and/or socially relevant ads, advertiser information such as email, phone number, and CPF/CNPJ (Meta, [N.d.]a; [N.d.]b).

Telegram

Telegram does not offer a repository with an interface for accessing and collecting data on ads in Brazil.

in LinkedIn

Based on testing, the data displayed in the LinkedIn Ads Repository interface is consistent with the data returned by the Platform Repository API.

Google

Data on the content of the pieces is not delivered by the Google BigQuery API, but can be accessed through the repository interface, in the case of political and electoral advertisements circulated in Brazil up until the end of April 2024.

X X/Twitter

There is no repository for accessing and collecting data on X/Twitter ads in Brazil.

🎵 TikTok

There is no repository for accessing and collecting data on TikTok ads in Brazil.

📺 Kwai

There is no repository for accessing and collecting data on Kwai ads in Brazil.

📌 Pinterest

There is no repository for accessing and collecting data about Pinterest ads in Brazil.

Relevance

Special Criterion 3

Q51

Is it possible to filter advertising data in the API by page or advertiser profile? (Special Criterion 3)

Here we check whether the social media platform's ad repository API allows the use of filters to search for up-to-date data on ads served by specific advertisers based on their unique identifiers.

∞ Meta For ads classified as political, electoral, and/or socially relevant, requests can be made to collect data from the advertiser's unique identifier through the Meta Ad Repository API. However, you must already be aware of the identifiers.	in LinkedIn The LinkedIn Ad Repository API does not allow for searching by specific advertiser. By entering the advertiser name in the request, the API returns ads from all advertisers whose name fully or partially matches the search terms.	🎵 TikTok There is no repository for accessing and collecting data on TikTok ads in Brazil.
Telegram The Telegram API does not allow for filtering the ad data request based on any criteria.	Google It is not possible to filter current data for a given advertiser through the Google BigQuery API, as this functionality is only available for political and electoral ads served in Brazil up until the end of April 2024.	Kwai There is no repository for accessing and collecting data on Kwai ads in Brazil.
	Pinterest There is no repository for accessing and collecting data about Pinterest ads in Brazil.	
	X/Twitter There is no repository for accessing and collecting data on X/Twitter ads in Brazil.	

Relevance

Q52

Does the API allow filtering ad data based on its category?

This checks for the possibility of retrieving updated ad data via the social media platform's ad repository API, according to the categories offered by the platform to advertisers at the time of ad creation.

∞ Meta The Meta Ad Repository API only provides access to data for ads classified as political, electoral, and/or socially relevant. Other ad categories are not available for filtering.	in LinkedIn The LinkedIn Ad Repository API does not support filtering ads by categories.	🎵 TikTok There is no repository for accessing and collecting data on TikTok ads in Brazil.
Telegram The Telegram API does not allow filtering the ad data request based on any criteria.	Google The Google BigQuery API does not allow filtering ads by categories.	Kwai There is no repository for accessing and collecting data on Kwai ads in Brazil.
	X/Twitter There is no repository for accessing and collecting data on X/Twitter ads in Brazil.	Pinterest There is no repository for accessing and collecting data about Pinterest ads in Brazil.

Relevance

Q53

Does the API allow me to filter ad data by geographic location?

This item checks whether one or more geographic location can be specified in the social network platform's ad repository API to filter for updated data - the Brazilian Federal Republic being the largest granularity accepted.

∞ Meta Meta's Ad Repository API allows you to filter ads classified as political, electoral and/or socially relevant based on the country of publication and the region in which the users to whom they were displayed reside – in the case of Brazil, the Federal Republic.	in LinkedIn The LinkedIn Ads Repository API only allows you to filter ads by country, and it is not possible to filter by Brazilian Federal Republic.	🎵 TikTok There is no repository for accessing and collecting data on TikTok ads in Brazil.
Telegram The Telegram API does not allow filtering the ad data request based on any criteria.	Google It is not possible to filter current data according to geographic criteria through the Google BigQuery API, as this function is only available for political and electoral ads circulated in Brazil up until the end of April 2024.	Kwai There is no repository for accessing and collecting data on Kwai ads in Brazil.
	X/Twitter There is no repository for accessing and collecting data on X/Twitter ads in Brazil.	Pinterest There is no repository for accessing and collecting data about Pinterest ads in Brazil.

Relevance

Special Criterion 6

Q54

Is it possible to filter ad data in the repository interface by page or advertiser profile? (Special Criterion 6)

This item checks whether the social media platform's ad repository interface allows the use of filters to search for updated data based on a specific advertiser's definition and selection.

∞ Meta The Meta Ad Repository interface search tool allows you to search for advertiser names, allowing you to access the advertiser's page in the interface, apply search filters and view all of their active ads and inactive political, electoral and/or socially relevant ads.	in LinkedIn LinkedIn does not allow users of the ads interface to select specific advertisers. When filtering advertisers by search terms, the interface returns ads from all advertisers that have the search term in their name.	🎵 TikTok There is no repository for accessing and collecting data on TikTok ads in Brazil.
	Google The Google Ads Repository interface only provides advertiser search and selection for ads served by verified advertisers within the last year, which does not show a representative and sufficient sample of ad data.	Kwai There is no repository for accessing and collecting data on Kwai ads in Brazil.
Telegram Telegram does not offer a repository with an interface for accessing and collecting data on ads in Brazil.		Pinterest There is no repository for accessing and collecting data about Pinterest ads in Brazil.
	X/Twitter There is no repository for accessing and collecting data on X/Twitter ads in Brazil.	

Relevance

Q55

Does the repository interface allow filtering of ad data according to its category?

This item checks whether updated ad data can be retrieved through the social media platform’s ad repository interface, according to the categories offered to advertisers at the time of ad creation and publication.

Meta Meta’s ad repository interface only allows you to filter by “social issues, election or politics ads” or “all ads,” though advertisers can select categories like “credit,” “jobs,” and “housing” when creating an ad.	LinkedIn It is not possible to filter ads by category in the LinkedIn Ad Repository interface.	TikTok There is no repository for accessing and collecting data on TikTok ads in Brazil.
	Google It is not possible to filter ads by category in the Google Ads Repository interface.	Kwai There is no repository for accessing and collecting data on Kwai ads in Brazil.
Telegram Telegram does not offer a repository with an interface for accessing and collecting data on ads in Brazil.	X/Twitter There is no repository for accessing and collecting data on X/Twitter ads in Brazil.	Pinterest There is no repository for accessing and collecting data about Pinterest ads in Brazil.

Relevance

Q56

Does the repository interface allow me to filter ad data by geographic location?

This item checks whether a geographic location, or more than one, can be specified in the social network platform’s ad repository interface to filter the collection of updated data, with the Brazilian Federal Republic being the largest granularity accepted.

Meta Meta’s ad repository interface allows you to filter the results of political, electoral and/or socially relevant ads by the Brazilian state where users viewed certain content	LinkedIn While the LinkedIn Ads Repository interface provides geographic filtering options, it is only possible to filter data by country.	TikTok There is no repository for accessing and collecting data on TikTok ads in Brazil.
	Google While the Google Ads Repository interface provides geo-filtering options, it is only possible to filter data by country.	Kwai There is no repository for accessing and collecting data on Kwai ads in Brazil.
Telegram Telegram does not offer a repository with an interface for accessing and collecting data on ads in Brazil.	X/Twitter There is no repository for accessing and collecting data on X/Twitter ads in Brazil.	Pinterest There is no repository for accessing and collecting data about Pinterest ads in Brazil.

Accuracy

Does the API divide impression ranges by audience segment into small intervals so that trends and audience segmentation strategies can be identified with some precision?

Q57

This item checks whether the social media platform's ad repository API provides ad impression volume, presenting up-to-date data divided into reasonable ranges to represent impressions in a manner that is close to the actual number stored by the platform. To score on this parameter, volumes of up to 1,000 impressions must be displayed in intervals of 100; between 1,000 and 10,000, in intervals of 500; between 10,000 and 100,000, in intervals of 1,000; above 100,000, in intervals of 10,000; and above 1 million, in intervals of 100,000.

Meta

The impression ranges provided by the Meta Ad Repository API do not meet the minimum criteria established in this parameter: their ranges start at 1,000 impressions, and the platform does not report the range when an ad receives more than 1 million impressions. In addition, this information is only available for ads classified as political, electoral and/or socially relevant.

Telegram

The Telegram API does not provide data on the volume of ad impressions.

LinkedIn

The LinkedIn Ads Repository API does not provide data on the volume of impressions of ads served in Brazil.

Google

Current ad impression data cannot be retrieved via the Google BigQuery API, as this information is only available for political and election ads served in Brazil through the end of April 2024.

X/Twitter

There is no repository for accessing and collecting data on X/Twitter ads in Brazil.

TikTok

There is no repository for accessing and collecting data on TikTok ads in Brazil.

Kwai

There is no repository for accessing and collecting data on Kwai ads in Brazil.

Pinterest

There is no repository for accessing and collecting data about Pinterest ads in Brazil.

Accuracy

Does the API divide investment bands into small increments that make it possible to identify trends and ad pricing strategies with some precision?

Q58

This item verifies whether the social media platform's ad repository API retrieves up-to-date data on values of ad spending, divided into reasonable ranges to represent the total spending as close to the actual number stored by the platform. To score on this parameter, values up to \$100 must be displayed in \$10 intervals; between \$100 and \$1,000 in \$100 intervals; between \$1,000 and \$10,000 in \$500 intervals; up to \$100,000 in \$1,000 intervals; and above \$100,000 in \$10,000 intervals.

Meta

The investment ranges provided by the Meta Ad Repository API do not meet the minimum criteria established in this parameter: their ranges start at R\$100 and investments between R\$50,000 and R\$100,000 have R\$10,000 ranges. In addition, this information is only available for ads classified as political, electoral and/or socially relevant.

Telegram

The Telegram API does not provide data on spending on ads.

LinkedIn

The LinkedIn Ads Repository API does not provide data on spending on ads in Brazil.

Google

Current data on ad spending cannot be retrieved via the Google BigQuery API, as this information is only available for political and electoral ads served in Brazil through the end of April 2024.

X/Twitter

There is no repository for accessing and collecting data on X/Twitter ads in Brazil.

TikTok

There is no repository for accessing and collecting data on TikTok ads in Brazil.

Kwai

There is no repository for accessing and collecting data on Kwai ads in Brazil.

Pinterest

There is no repository for accessing and collecting data about Pinterest ads in Brazil.

Accuracy

Does the repository interface divide impression ranges by audience segment into small increments so that trends and content segmentation strategies can be identified with some precision?

Q59

This item verifies that the social media platform's ad repository interface retrieves ad impression volumes, presenting up-to-date data divided into reasonable ranges to represent impressions as close to the actual number stored by the platform. To score on this parameter, volumes of up to 1,000 impressions must be displayed in 100-range intervals; between 1,000 and 10,000, in 500-range intervals; between 10,000 and 100,000, in 1,000-range intervals; above 100,000, in 10,000-range intervals; and above 1 million, in 100,000-range intervals.

- Meta

The impression ranges provided by Meta's ad repository interface do not meet the minimum criteria established in this parameter: their ranges start at ranges of 1,000 impressions and the platform does not report the range when an ad receives more than 1 million impressions. Furthermore, this information is only available for ads classified as political, electoral and/or socially relevant.
- LinkedIn

The LinkedIn Ads Repository interface does not display data on the volume of impressions received by ads served in Brazil.
- TikTok

There is no repository for accessing and collecting data on TikTok ads in Brazil.
- Kwai

There is no repository for accessing and collecting data on Kwai ads in Brazil.
- Pinterest

There is no repository for accessing and collecting data about Pinterest ads in Brazil.
- Telegram

Telegram does not offer a repository with an interface for accessing and collecting data on ads in Brazil.
- Google

It is not possible to retrieve current data through impressions received by ads through the Google Ads Repository interface, as this information is only available for political and electoral ads served in Brazil up to the end of April 2024.
- X/Twitter

There is no repository for accessing and collecting data on X/Twitter ads in Brazil.

Accuracy

Does the repository interface divide investment ranges into small increments so that trends and ad pricing strategies can be identified with some precision?

Q60

This item verifies whether the social media platform's ad repository interface provides up-to-date data on ad spending, divided into intervals with a reasonable range to portray the total spending as close to the actual number stored by the platform. To score in this parameter, spending of up to R\$100 must be displayed in intervals of R\$10; between R\$100 and R\$1,000, in intervals of R\$100; between R\$1,000 and R\$10,000, in intervals of R\$500; up to R\$100,000, in intervals of R\$1,000; and above R\$100,000, in intervals of R\$10,000.

- Meta

The investment ranges provided by the Meta Ad Repository API do not meet the minimum criteria established in this parameter: their ranges start at R\$100 and investments between R\$50,000 and R\$100,000 have ranges of R\$10,000. In addition, this information is only available for ads classified as political, electoral and/or socially relevant.
- LinkedIn

LinkedIn's ad repository interface does not provide data on investment in ads served in Brazil.
- TikTok

There is no repository for accessing and collecting data on TikTok ads in Brazil.
- Kwai

There is no repository for accessing and collecting data on Kwai ads in Brazil.
- Pinterest

There is no repository for accessing and collecting data about Pinterest ads in Brazil.
- Telegram

Telegram does not offer a repository with an interface for accessing and collecting data on ads in Brazil.
- Google

It is not possible to retrieve current data on ad spending through the Google Ads Repository interface, as this information is only available for political and electoral ads served in Brazil through the end of April 2024.
- X/Twitter

There is no repository for accessing and collecting data on X/Twitter ads in Brazil.

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